

Value-Theory and Criticism

By ORME A. C. FELL

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ments for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy
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To JOHN DEWEY


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—O. A. H. P.



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Contents

INTRODUCTION.....	3
CHAPTER I. Value-Theory and its Implications...	5
CHAPTER II. Value as Felt Satisfaction.....	10
CHAPTER III. Value as Constituted by Interest.....	28
CHAPTER IV. Value as Enjoyed Meanings.....	42
CHAPTER V. Some Implications Examined.....	54
CONCLUSION.....	74

Introduction

If the question is asked, why science, a “new messiah” to some, is to others a grim spectre, one answer, at least, is obvious. The sciences, in order to achieve their results, have consciously ruled out of their subject-matter all that lies nearest to men’s hearts. They have insisted (and, for their purposes, rightly) on dealing only with cold, hard facts, irrespective of the attitudes of men, their likes and dislikes, their hopes and fears, their loves and hatred. In much the same way the “touch of cold philosophy” has seemed often to dissect the living tissue of life until nothing of its vital warmth remained. While occasionally philosophy has given us great visions, its devotion to abstraction and the analytic method has all too often led to results of infinite subtlety but of little importance.

This accusation against philosophy seemed the more justified during the period when the majority of philosophers were absorbed in a study of the process of knowing, an inquiry without interest and almost incomprehensible to the average man. Those things which are closer to men than their intellectual operations—their feelings, strivings and emotions—were excluded, except as they entered as the subject-matter of such separate studies as ethics, religion, æsthetics and economic theory. For philosophy proper, the intellect and its place in the universe was the predominating issue.

Nevertheless the temporarily neglected aspects of experience remained, and could not be ignored indefinitely. They were brought again into consideration, but this time by those whose chief interest had been, and still was, epistemology, and who were anxious to carry over the method of the critique to moral and æsthetic

judgments. Hence when the old familiar problems reappeared, it was under the guise of a new terminology. For terms were needed which would be more general than those of the special sciences and which would lend themselves more easily to the epistemological methods to be employed. So instead of the Good and the Beautiful, we hear of value and valuables, value judgments and judgments *of* value, valuation and *evaluation*, Wert, valeur, valore and their derivatives.

Clothed in those terms, the problem of value was bound up inevitably with current epistemological and metaphysical controversies, and consequently seemed to many to have acquired an academic futility almost equal to that of epistemology itself. But behind its ruthless analysis and hair-splitting distinctions the controversy contained subject-matter of very immediate concern to man. For at the heart of contemporary value-theory lie problems fundamental for men's happiness—the problems concerning the place in the universe of men's needs and desires. It may be, therefore, that theories of value are not as unrelated to the concrete problems of experience as they might seem at first glance, and the contrast in the implications that follow from contrasting value-theories may be of some significance for the student of social problems. To attempt to develop some of these implications is the purpose of this paper.

CHAPTER I

Value-Theory and its Implications

Every age has its conflicts and its confusions; every age has its own problems, not quite like those of any other times, to face and to solve as best it may. The continual clash of innovation and tradition, as well as the conflicts within each, force each generation constantly to revise and reform their ideals, to decide afresh what is to be desired. This search for the desirable, for what is to be chosen as the "better," involves what we may call (using the term in its most general sense) criticism; that is, the judging or appraising of values.

The position taken in this paper, therefore, is: that to develop a theory of criticism, should be to formulate a process by means of which a satisfactory reshaping of values might be carried on. That is, a theory of criticism should be such that, whatever other interests it might fulfill, it would, in its application, be relevant to the resolving of actual conflicts between values. To resolve conflicts between values, criticism must be relevant to these values upon which it operates, and it will be relevant to them in proportion as it develops out of the nature of the values themselves. Now, value-theories will differ in the extent to which criticism and "improvement" of values are inherent in the value-concept employed, and consequently they will differ in the validity of such criticism and its capacity to adjust conflicts. This, therefore, is a point of view from which different theories of value may profitably be compared.

One difference in theories of value of fundamental importance for theories of criticism is the difference between those who hold values to be objective, or absolute, and those who hold them to be subjective, or relative to human experience. Among the former, the absolutists, we may place those, such as G. E. Moore, who consider value as a logically primitive character, attaching to objects as a quality incapable of further analysis;¹ those who, like Munsterberg, Bosanquet and others, account for value in terms of an Eternal Mind or Will;² and those for whom, as for Urban, value is determined by an absolute and wholly objective value-scale.³ Now the effect of criticism is that of bringing about in some way a modification of what men consider valuable. But in theories of this objective or absolute type, values are entirely unaffected by men's valuings, or by modifications in men's valuings; hence, there will be little or no connection between the nature of these values and the process of the modification of men's valuings. So for this type of theory there will be, *in this respect* at least, little or no connection between value and criticism.

Since the relativists, on the other hand, have no other criterion of value than men's attitude, the effect of a change in attitude will be an actual modification of values. Therefore, for *them* light is thrown on the problem of the nature of criticism by the nature of value itself. Consequently, it is relativistic theories alone that we can judge on the basis of the theory of criticism to which they

1. G. E. Moore, *Principia Ethica*, 1903, Ch. 1. See also B. Russell, "The Elements of Ethics," in *Philosophic Essays*, 1910; and J. Laird, *The Idea of Value*, 1929, esp. Chs. 7 and 9.

2. H. Munsterberg, *The Eternal Values*, 1909, Ch. 6, 14. B. Bosanquet, *The Principle of Individuality and Value*, 1912, Lecture 1.

3. W. Urban, *Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. 13 (1916), "Value and Existence," p. 448; *ibid.*, "Knowledge of Value and the Value Judgment," p. 673; and *ibid.*, Vol. 14 (1917), "The Ontological Problem of Value," p. 309; also his *The Intelligible World*, 1929.

lead. Because of this we shall restrict our discussion from now on to the relativistic type of value-theory.

The problem of the nature of criticism is for this type of theory, as we have seen, the problem of the factors involved in the modifications of human valuations. While there would be general assent to the statement that cognition is one of these factors that in some way result in a change of values, there is no agreement as to the nature of cognition or its exact relation to the valuing process and to the object valued. Yet these problems are significant. For to ask what is the function of cognition and the importance of that function, is to ask what should be the part played by thought in life. What is the relation of thought to our emotional life? When the emotional tendencies within an individual—his desires, impulses, interests—conflict, by what means is he to settle the conflict? Moreover, what methods are to be used in settling the clash of interests among different individuals? Is it desirable and possible to work out consciously a harmony of wills, or must society depend upon such unconscious factors as the so-called gregarious instinct, imitation and suggestibility, habit and custom? Are values themselves primarily individual or social in character; that is, do they concern the individual and his relation to his physical environment, or are they the product of the reactions and relationships of individuals to one another?

It will easily be seen that the ramifications of these problems extend into many fields. The integration of conflicting impulses within an individual is a problem not only for the ethical theorist, but for the moral and religious teacher and for the individual himself. It is a problem no man can avoid. In the province of the arts, the influence of thought and the relative importance of thought and emotion has long been a moot question, and

is one of importance for æsthetic and literary criticism. The rights of individual preferences as compared with those of other individuals or those of the group, concern the active worker in politics, law and sociology, as well as the student in these fields. This problem, and the one closely associated with it—that of the methods to be used in influencing the preferences of others—are important not only for the groups just mentioned but for the parent and educator as well. Finally, men's beliefs concerning the possibility of constructing an increasingly harmonious society by their own efforts and the use of intelligence, may color their whole Weltanschauung, and determine whether their attitude towards existing institutions and traditions shall be liberal or conservative, radical or reactionary.

We cannot in this paper follow out in detail these consequences. But on account of their close connection with the process of criticism, it may be interesting to follow out, along the lines indicated, the implications for the theory of criticism of the value-theories of several contemporary writers. Because their theories show marked differences in spite of essential similarity, three of these writers, Professors David W. Prall, Ralph Barton Perry and John Dewey, give us material for an interesting comparison, and our inquiry henceforth will be limited to the works of these men. All three are in accord on the fundamental position that all values are relative to human experience, and hence no external and objective criterion is to be sought. But they differ as to the aspect of experience on which values depend, whether on a motor-affective attitude alone, or on an experience which includes necessarily both motor-affective response and cognition. Differing thus on the part played by reflection in the valuing process, they naturally disagree as to the

nature and function of criticism. A disagreement on this subject may, as we have suggested, lead to a difference in attitudes not without importance for those interested in the solving of social problems.

We shall, therefore, take up, separately, the value-theories of Prall, of Perry and of Dewey; noting in each case the implication of the value-theory for theory of criticism, and suggesting briefly some of the fields in which a difference in theories of criticism might result in a difference in the methods of handling more specific problems.

CHAPTER II

Value as Felt Satisfaction

The feeling of immediate satisfaction in the presence of something (whether object or idea) is a familiar occurrence. To be absorbed by something, to enjoy it, to linger over it, is an experience as it were complete in itself; in the presence of such enjoyment no need is felt for thought, that is, for thought in the sense of reflection, nor for further knowledge. The experience is not cognitive, but immediate, æsthetic. Now value, for Prall, is to be found only in experience of this particular kind and, therefore, for him all value is, in this sense, æsthetic.¹ It is the quality of satisfaction felt by a mind in the presence of something which it delights to contemplate; and it is the quality felt only in this immediate way.

But we cannot understand the nature of the contemplation and the satisfaction of which Prall speaks apart from an understanding of the epistemological basis on which his theory of value is built.² The epistemological dualism to which he adheres, maintains that what the mind is directly aware of, and which is called a datum (something "given"), is never an existing substance or thing,³ but always an immediately intuited quality. These

1. Not to be confused with the narrower meaning of "æsthetic." See Prall, *Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. 18 (1921), "The Esthetic Heresy," p. 518, and the *University of California Publications in Philosophy*, Vol. 3 (1918-1921), "A Study in the Theory of Value," p. 275; also his reference there in a footnote, to B. Croce, *Æsthetic*, English translation, Ch. I; also G. Santayana, *Sense of Beauty*, Ch. I, especially pp. 28-31.

2. See Prall, *Metaphysics and Value*. *University of California Publications in Philosophy*, Vol. 5 (1924), p. 122, "what I take to be a sound notion of value is allied in my mind with a theory of knowledge which denies immanence either as the idealists or as neo-realists assert it, and which holds to a dualism."

3. Prall, *Value and Thought Process*. *Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. 21 (1924), p. 122, "As Mr. Santayana puts it, nothing given exists; and I had made up my mind to that long ago."

"essential qualities" supervene upon the flux of nature and life,¹ and give us in each case a "self-defining nature or being that is nothing else, but solely and separately its purely qualitative and unique self."² It is these "essences" or "forms" of which the mind is directly aware,³ and it is these which constitute the basis of all our conscious experience.

But while these data or essences form the *content* of perception and of knowledge, which is built on perception, they themselves are neither. For perception involves relations, references beyond this immediate experience, while intuition is just this immediate experience itself, the awareness of data in their isolation.⁴ That is the reason that Prall, in his treatment of æsthetic experience, stresses the importance of surfaces, or the mere external form that the object presents to our senses. "It is characteristic of æsthetic apprehension that the surface fully present to sense is the total object of apprehension. We do not so much perceive an object as intuit its appearance, and as we leave this surface in our attention, to go deeper into meanings or more broadly into connections and relations, we depart from the typically æsthetic attitude."⁵ When *perception* beings, that is, when the datum is taken as a sign of something else, then intuition as such is over.

1. See Prall, *Æsthetic Judgment*, 1929, p. 7, "Not only the physical world but all life is a flux. Beauty, if it is seen or heard or felt, is recognized as a quality supervening upon this flux in some particular situation. And situations are marked for human minds by these supervening qualities and by nothing else." See also *ibid.*, p. 9, "For mind the flux of events is arrested in recognizable forms, which thus have their own permanent identity."

2. *Ibid.*, p. 10.

3. *Ibid.*, p. 13, "what such [æsthetic] experience takes as its object is not existing things but their essential qualities, not events but appearing essences or forms immediately and satisfyingly present to us." Also *ibid.*, pp. 28-29, "[beauty] is like all other qualities the essence or form attended to by direct feeling."

4. See Prall, *Study in Theory of Value*, p. 201, "If there is one mark of the æsthetic consciousness that is definite and pronounced, it is the intrinsic or isolated nature of the experience."

5. Prall, *Æsthetic Judgment*, p. 20.

Only when experience definitely "stops short of perception" do we have intuition.¹

For Prall æsthetic, in the sense of intuitive, experience is not always the experience of beauty, for the intuition of beauty seems to be something "beyond the apprehension of the ordinary qualities."² But intuition seems to involve a process to be distinguished from the experience of beauty; namely, the process of finding things pleasant, or unpleasant.³ This motor-affective attitude of liking, or its opposite, is always present, and for Prall, this attitude, and this alone, creates value. "Value," he says,⁴ "is precisely the term applied in common usage to objects which stand at the outer end of a relation called liking, the inner end of which is a human mind that likes." And again, "The feeling of any animal that has any feeling is all that is needed to give a situation where there is value. . . . The ruminating cow, the cud she chews, and the feeling of acceptance instead of riddance that keeps her chewing, comprise a good case of a situation in which value occurs. . . . Value is thus constituted in tropisms if you like."⁵

As to the relation of this motor-affective attitude which constitutes value and the intuition of purely sensory

1. Prall, *Metaphysics and Value*, p. 129. Also *ibid.*, p. 128, "Perceiving means putting content into a relational context while intuiting means keeping content out of any context whatever and merely having it before us as what it appears."

2. Prall, *Æsthetic Judgment*, p. 19. See also *ibid.*, p. 58, "As we pass from the perceptually discriminated quality, taken as sensed, to the intuited beauty immediately felt, we pass from terms like bright and clear and red, to warmly red, pleasantly bright, charmingly clear, or to attractive, or lovely or fascinating."

3. *Ibid.*, p. 16, "King James liked his old friends best because they were like comfortable old shoes, and I suppose that even King James hardly thought his old shoes beautiful. So of much that we prefer or like or even love; we should never think of calling it beautiful, whether it is oysters to eat, or old friends to see, or old shoes to wear."

4. Prall, *Present Status of the Theory of Value*. University of California Publications in Philosophy, Vol. 4, p. 84.

5. Prall, *Value and Thought Process*, p. 122. See also *ibid.*, "an infant is having such enjoyment when it draws on a teething ring, or Aristotle's God when he contemplates the universe."

qualities (if such there is) Prall is not clear. His very frequent use of the word "felt" as synonymous with "intuited" seems to suggest that he believes both the presentation to the mind of the datum, and the emotional response of liking, to be combined in a single process. The datum appears to the mind not as a simple sense quality, but as "just that qualitatively acceptable or objectionable simplicity or complexity that is its felt nature, pleasant or unpleasant, satisfying merely in the contemplation or not satisfying, beautiful or ugly, good or bad."¹

Intuition itself thus seems to be a selective process on the part of the organism, selective in the sense that the datum in order to be intuited at all, has to make some sort of appeal, positive or negative. "Human beings know," says Prall, "in all the knowledge that they have ever had at all, of any sort, something about a colored, opaque, tangible world, felt by them in the first place as just there before them to be accepted or perhaps to be got rid of."² There is no necessity, therefore, of supposing a mental act of intuition and then an added motor-affective response that would give rise to value; on the contrary, intuition itself is valuing. For value is just that quality of the datum as it is intuited, that "felt character."³ If this would seem to make all intuitions experiences of value, a distinction between value and non-value intuitions might be maintained by admitting a

1. Prall, *Metaphysics and Value*, p. 119. See also *ibid.*, p. 123, "a definition of value which finds value exclusively in a relation between the mind and its *immediately felt datum*." (Italics mine)

2. *Ibid.*, p. 121.

3. *Ibid.*, p. 120. See also *ibid.*, p. 116, "Value is merely the possession of the part of an object of its own qualitative nature as this is apparent to us, its being what sort of an object it is in the eyes of whoever sees it, of intent wicked or charitable, useful, that is, or not in the circumstances, pleasant or not to sense, either to be dwelt upon or turned from immediately upon apprehension."; and *ibid.*, p. 119, "Positive value is thus æsthetic quality, felt satisfactoriness." He also uses "felt" frequently in describing the experiences of beauty; e. g., see *Æsthetic Judgment*, p. 23, "beauty is always just felt."

difference in the intensity of the motor-affective response; as the intensity approached its lower limit, the value-quality of the experience would become negligible.¹

Thus all value is constituted in the liking or enjoyment of immediately intuited data, and in this sense, all value for Prall is æsthetic. But a theory which makes this claim will have to account for the other "so-called" types of value, such as the ethical and the logical. In the case of ethical value, Prall's solution is simple. Since value is immediately felt character, it is always intrinsic; that is, it is always an end, never a means to an end. For means, being relational, are perceived, not intuited;² so they are never values. They are good for something, but, as means, they are not good in themselves. Therefore, in so far as ethical and moral qualities, such as justice and kindness, are means to an end, for instance to the preservation of the state or the welfare of humanity,³ they are not values in the proper sense of the word. It is only in so far as moral acts are viewed as ends in themselves and are satisfying to contemplate in and of themselves, apart from any consequences, that they may be said to be values. But contemplating with satisfaction is, as we have seen, an æsthetic experience, so that the ultimate ethical standard for Prall, is æsthetic after all.⁴ The goal of all ethics is a world "good to live in," and such a world would be one whose appearance would be æsthetically satisfying

1. Prall does use this explanation to account for the fact that the same object presented to the senses will sometimes appear beautiful and sometimes not. *Æsthetic Judgment*, p. 26, "The two cases of seeing a prospect as beautiful and seeing it as not beautiful are most probably cases of the relative intensity or volume of the processes going on. But at a sufficiently low degree of intensity, due to any of a thousand causes . . . the feeling is almost nil and the beauty has faded or quite vanished."

2. See Prall, *Metaphysics and Value*, p. 134, "It seems clear that means are perceived instead of being intuited."

3. See Prall, *University of California Publications in Philosophy*, Vol. 7 (1925), No. 3, "Naturalism and Norms," p. 78.

4. See Prall, *Æsthetic Judgment*, p. 346, "It is after all æsthetic criteria that are final in judging the value of all things."

to its inhabitants. "If we are to be happy in a world as it really lies before us and about us in its actual appearance, that appearance cannot remain unsatisfactory to contemplate; that is, æsthetically unsatisfactory—condemned in the bare honesty of recording æsthetic judgments."¹ Because the ideal world is to be æsthetically satisfying, it can be pictured now only in æsthetic terms. "Thus it is finally æsthetic criteria that allow us to make those ethical and moral evaluations that we agree upon sooner or later; and it is æsthetic discernment that is required both to see the evils of the world and to picture a better one from which they can be said to have been removed."² So we see that for Prall moral values are pure means, pure machinery, so to speak, or else they are out and out æsthetic in nature, and like all other satisfying intuitions, depend upon our motor-affective attitudes.³

As to the so-called logical value, the value of truth, it also for Prall is æsthetic in nature. For truth, according to his theory, is that way of viewing nature ("nature being the word for what minds have experience of")⁴ which is satisfactory to contemplate; it is, therefore, a human value. But that is not to say it is subjective, or dependent on the mind. Truth represents a fitness between our minds and nature, and fitness is a relation which obviously depends as well upon nature as upon our

1. Prall, *Æsthetic Judgment*, p. 349. See also *ibid.*, p. 342, his reference to "the actual surface immediately present on every hand . . . appearing to him either beautiful or ugly, and so by virtue of its æsthetic surface good or bad to live in."

2. *Ibid.*, p. 349. See also *ibid.*, p. 348, "once a critic or a prophet or a reformer turns to the future, his dreams themselves are æsthetic structures," etc., and p. 339, "critics of society, and reformers, if they are to be at all adequate to their self-appointed task, must ultimately employ æsthetic criteria."

3. Prall, *Metaphysics and Value*, p. 135. See pp. 134-140. Also *Study in Theory of Value*, pp. 199-201, 266, and *Esthetic Heresy*, p. 519, "Stealing or boasting or lying we shall refrain from in the end because these activities are not objects of satisfied contemplation to the well-trained man." See also *Naturalism and Norms*, pp. 78-79.

4. Prall, *Present Status*, p. 91.

minds.¹ Logical relations, or truths, are certainly among the objects desired by human beings, but their being true is not their being desired. Propositions are true when they characterize existent reality;² it is this relation, and not their being desired, that gives them their logical nature, and in that sense their truth is independent of mind. Nevertheless, the *value* of truth, like the value of anything else, is constituted in the relation "satisfying to a contemplating subject,"³ and is, therefore, purely aesthetic.

So there are for Prall no values at all other than aesthetic. The process of valuing occurs only when the data which make up the "panorama which passes before us"⁴ are intuited in an immediate way as satisfying or not satisfying. But we have been dealing so far only with single individuals, and with momentary felt satisfactions, and this, obviously, is not an adequate account of our whole experience. "Our desire to live well," as Prall says,⁵ "includes living well over a period of some few years and living among other men." So we find ourselves faced with situations more complicated than those we have dealt with, situations in which a conflict of values occurs, and a choice among them is made necessary. How does the value-theory of Prall account for this choice?

He attributes the necessity for choice to the conflict of impulses among themselves and the conflict of impulses with ideals.⁶ By ideals he means images or mental representations of future satisfactions, as contrasted with

1. Prall, *Present Status*, p. 92.

2. Prall, *Naturalism and Norms*, p. 84, "All assertions claim to be true simply because when we assert any proposition we are claiming to characterize the world we live in. This characterizing relation is that in which all true propositions stand to existential reality, to facts, whether or not we ever have demonstrable certainty that they do so stand."

3. *Ibid.*, p. 83.

4. Prall, *Metaphysics and Value*, p. 120.

5. Prall, *Naturalism and Norms*, p. 71.

6. Prall, *Esthetic Heresy*, pp. 516-517.

present enjoyments. "Our powers of representation," he says, "put before us gradually a series of ideas that we hold together in the end as ideals—finished off representations in the mind of desirable states to be in, desirable activities to be at, desirable conditions to have realized—satisfactory consummations appropriate to human beings living with other human beings in the world."¹ When the image or ideal thus intuited is more appealing, when it acts as a stronger stimulus than the momentary desire, then we act according to the ideal. The deciding factor in the choice is the relative power as stimuli of the different intuitions. One datum simply appears as more satisfying than another. Thus, in exactly the same way that satisfaction in contemplation constitutes generic value, so preference, of this immediate and intuitive kind, constitutes comparative value, or betterness. The good is that which is liked; the better is that which is preferred.

However, to say that the preference which constitutes betterness is immediate and thus non-cognitive, is not to say that there has been no thought or judgments prior to the preference. Indeed, there would be no adult mind without a background of perceiving, thinking and judging.² In many cases the previous judging is an essential condition of the preferring, which could occur "only after many other interests have been considered and after many judgments of value have been made and their implications noted."³ For in intuition the whole mind, the whole man, is involved, and, therefore, all the man's previous experience will be conditions of the valuing or preferring.

1. Prall, *Esthetic Heresy*, pp. 516-517.

2. Prall, *Metaphysics and Value*, p. 127, "It is probably true that in most cases of the intuition of the beauty of things such intuition could take place only by the act of a mind which has already had many perceptions; no adult mind is in any other condition."

3. Prall, *Study in Theory of Value*, p. 262. See also Prall, *Present Status*, p. 87, "[Values] are all in part, but never wholly the consequences of judgments, and the qualities and characters of values are thus the fruits of judgment; judgment determines them."

"This preference, being the act of some kind of unified creature, a creature itself the outcome of all its past preferences, all its past history, all its mental discriminations, all its previous valuing and judgments and observings . . . this preference is the creature himself."¹

Therefore, though Prall insists that all valuing is immediate and non-cognitive, depending for its existence entirely on momentary satisfaction, yet there are differences in the experience of the individuals who do the valuing, and in that sense there are values of greater or less maturity and complexity.² "Æsthetic appreciation of the highest type" is that "of the most complex sort, involving more intricate coördination mentally, and quicker and more acute perception."³ This acuteness Prall believes to be due to training in observation and in "artistic technique." Training in the technique of the arts not only increases effective creative ability, but is "the only training for æsthetic contemplation,"⁴ for by making our perception more acute it widens and gives more detail to our field of experience. It thus opens the way for more intuitions, by enlarging and refining "the organ of intuition, which is the mind."⁵

But on what grounds can Prall advocate this increase in detail? In what way can he say that trained perception is not only more acute but is "better"? It could not be on the purely quantitative grounds of "the more intuitions

1. Prall, *Present Status*, p. 102. See also Prall, *Study in Theory of Value*, p. 271, "A rational being is some sort of a unity, however loose or ill-defined, and the impressions to which he is open are largely determined by the state of development of his mind," etc.

2. Prall, *Study in Theory of Value*, p. 263, the "term 'higher' corresponds not to any difference in the natures of the values as such, but to the length or complexity of the various processes which precede such higher valuing."

3. Prall, *Esthetic Heresy*, p. 517.

4. *Ibid.*, p. 519. See also *Æsthetic Judgment*, p. 210, "One actually does not experience any work of art unless one is sufficiently practiced in its technique to discriminate its structural and sensuous surface," etc.

5. Prall, *Metaphysics and Value*, p. 130. See also p. 134.

the better”;¹ for nothing considered by itself is valuable, and no added amounts of anything would be *more* valuable, unless they were actually valued; that is, actually enjoyed. Consistently, then, with his own premises, Prall could say that the more detailed perceptions would be “better” only if they were actually preferred by men. And this is just what he believes to be the case. The mature judgment, then, is better because, and only because, it is actually preferred to the immature; because, as he says, “I *find* that I actually do lay higher value on my present valuations than on my earlier ones. To say that my judgment of to-day is better than my judgment of ten years ago is merely recording the fact that towards my present judgment I have a motor-affective attitude of liking, whereas towards my judgment of ten years ago I am indifferent or even averse.”² The processes of thinking and judging that I may have gone through in the period between the two occasions, does not alter the nature of the second, or mature, value; the later valuing is still an immediate, æsthetic, non-cognitive experience.³ But “expert” valuing, valuing that occurs after much training and mature judging, and after the acquisition of technique, happens to be actually more satisfying to men than their crude untrained enjoyments. It is only because this is found to be the case that training and thought are valuable at all, and that the enjoyments following them can be said to be “better.”

Now the sphere of life where technical activity and satisfying contemplation seem to Prall to be predominant is the field of art, and, consequently, we find Prall empha-

1. See Prall's criticism of Perry's quantitative standards, *Study in Theory of Value*, p. 213.

2. Prall, *Study in Theory of Value*, p. 258.

3. See *ibid.*, p. 259, “In the most complex cases imaginable, when long processes of reasoning have gone on, the resulting value is always constituted by a motor-affective attitude which is not a logical or judgmental activity,” etc.

sizing the importance of artistic creation and enjoyment above all else.¹ "The typical happy human activity is the enjoyment of art, both in the making and as completed. More than this, it would follow that artistic activity is the sole satisfying vocation of man, that technical training in the arts is the first human want and the last, that the methods and processes of the arts are the first interest of science, and the one pressing business of philosophy."² In fact, according to this view, philosophy itself is "the servant of art, and at best one of its forms."³ Prall does not wish the word art to be taken in too narrow a sense, to be limited to the content of museums, art galleries and concerts;⁴ he seems to mean by art the creation and "expert contemplation"⁵ of any form of beauty. Yet, undoubtedly, he believes that beauty is found most readily in what we ordinarily mean by "works of art."⁶ These above all things give satisfaction to the individual contemplating them. Consequently, these things, above all, are of value.

According to this theory of value, where the good is the immediately satisfying, and the better is the immediately preferred, what form will criticism take? (And I am speaking of criticism in its generic sense, not of criticism in some specialized field, such as literature or painting.) Criticism is generally considered to be a judg-

1. See *Æsthetic Judgment*, p. 348, where, speaking of a dreamed-of Utopia, he says that such a society "will not be adequate to any full human being, or rationally to be desired by other men, or a satisfactory consummation if achieved, unless the dreamer has dreamt of beauty in it, and of art and artists, the function of art in life and of artists in society being of prime importance to men's happiness in any circumstances."

2. Prall, *Esthetic Heresy*, p. 518. See also *Æsthetic Judgment*, p. 351, "... if society must have high priests at all, we might well substitute great artists as at least better candidates for the temple than the philosophers whom Plato would have made kings."

3. *Ibid.*, p. 518.

4. See *ibid.*, p. 523 ff.

5. See *ibid.*

6. *Ibid.*, p. 519, "What *can* we contemplate with delight? . . . The answer . . . is Works of Art."

ment passed on the value of something; it is as it were a valuation, or evaluation, of that thing. But what must the nature of criticism necessarily be in the case where valuing is entirely a non-cognitive, non-judgmental process? Criticism will be an analysis of a value which has already been felt. "Æsthetic judgment is distinguished from æsthetic experience as such by the single fact that it follows and records such experience after the experience has been had, and with reference to what was experienced."¹ Criticism in any field, such as painting, music, or drama, will be an analysis of this æsthetic experience, that is an analysis of the part played by different factors in giving rise to the experience of beauty. "What we need for criticism is minds which can really see and react to what is put before them, not primarily scholars in the academic sense, but men who have observed until they are expert observers, not observers of the details merely, but observers of the technical details as actually connected with the effects produced."²

But this criticism of which we have been speaking is criticism within specific æsthetic fields; what shall we say of criticism in the more general sense as we have used the word before? According to this value-theory of Prall, where the good is the immediately satisfying, and the better is the immediately preferred, there can be no criticism of the general type, no criticism except of the specific type we have described above. All value is a matter of æsthetic experience, of delight in the intuition

1. Prall, *The Æsthetic Judgment*, p. 5. See also *ibid.*, preface, p. vi, "I have treated æsthetic judgments as records of æsthetic experience," and *Study in Theory of Value*, p. 274, "Our judgment is the *post facto* expression of the fact that value was present in a certain situation."

2. Prall, *Present Status*, p. 100. See also *The Æsthetic Judgment*, p. 352, "from the simple elementary judgments which are bare records of the experiencing of beauty, there are developed in fuller æsthetic criticism, judgments of evaluation according to standards, themselves furnished by æsthetic discrimination and taste; then in more fully developed criticism, æsthetic analysis and also explanation in terms of technical processes employed and the technical details contributory to the effect or point."

of an essence. The requisite, then, of a critic will in all cases be the ability to express this delight and to analyze this experience clearly. But since, as we have seen above, Prall believes that mature and expert judgments are as a matter of fact preferred to immature and inexperienced ones, the "good" critic (i. e., the one preferred) will be the one who, besides expressing himself well, shows these desired qualities in his judgments. These result primarily from training in observation and perception, without which, Prall finds, the mind is "inadequate" to such things as objects of art. For the critic must above all be adequate to the object he is criticizing; and "the most adequate critic is simply the most adequate human being."¹

Because the critic is expressing his own individual reaction of satisfaction or dissatisfaction, Prall seems to feel that for his experience to be important or interesting to men, the critic must in some way represent the majority of men, or the normal man. He must be an expert, but at the same time he must be "fully human"² and quite normal.³ Perhaps Prall's point of view is best summed up in his own conclusion that "criticism depends for its fullness and value upon the capacity and sensibility of the critic's mind; for its validity upon his normality and his logical acumen; and for its importance upon *his* importance, upon his adequacy, that is, to speak for human beings."⁴ He believes that human beings really can be represented in this way, a belief which accounts, perhaps, for his frequent references to men's "genuine

1. Prall, *Study in Theory of Value*, p. 277. See also p. 279, "what is peculiar to the critic would thus appear to be adequate reaction." See also *ibid.*, p. 285.

2. See *ibid.*, p. 277, "The best criticism is simply the most accurate expression of the most fully human response."

3. See Prall, *Present Status*, p. 95, "The normality and human vision of Russell," and p. 97, "the only appeal for the validity of these new values is to some sort of normality in human beings," etc.

4. See Prall, *Study in Theory of Value*, p. 285.

needs," "their real likes," "true interests," to "what the natural man finds valuable,"¹ etc.

All this may seem to assume a similarity among men, such that while we admit every value to be a particular momentary response of an individual, we can still generalize about the likes and dislikes of mankind. Indeed, this similarity is not only presupposed throughout much of Prall's writing on value, but is made explicit on several occasions. Those objects, he says, which "are most satisfactory to most minds will be most valuable, remembering in the end, as we have faith—a sort of Humian faith—minds are alike in structure."² This accounts for "the enormous amount of agreement"³ which he finds in artistic taste, and it also accounts for what he considers standards. There are, of course, no absolute standards, but he believes that his "theory of value as relative to individual taste leaves objects permanently valuable because individuals are so much alike. And it gives us what we call standards of value, criteria of validity even in the remotest regions of the fine arts, for the same reason."⁴

Since, according to this view, criticism is the expressing of a purely personal attitude, it is not concerned with conflicts between different attitudes. Yet it would seem as

1. See Prall, *Present Status*, p. 102, and also *Esthetic Heresy*, pp. 519 and 525, etc.

2. Prall, *Study in Theory of Value*, p. 281. See also *Æsthetic Judgment*, p. 334, "So far as men have senses alike, so far as they are capable through training or native endowment, of the same sort of discriminating perception . . ." etc.

3. Prall, *Present Status*, p. 98. See also the passage following, "Differences of taste are so much emphasized just because differences are so emphatic in their very nature. One freshman who should wear a straw hat on campus would cause more disturbance than the few thousand not so differentiated. So of all forms of disagreement. It is by neglecting this obvious fact that we come to hold difference of taste to be characteristic of taste." See also Prall, *Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. 20 (1923), "In Defence of a *Worthless* Theory of Values," footnote, p. 129, "The essential disagreement that is cited so often to rule out the case of æsthetic taste here is largely a Philistine myth or a misunderstanding of the artists' interest in the particulars of their subject," etc.

4. Prall, *Present Status*, p. 98.

though the need for criticism, that is, for passing judgment on values, would arise just when there is such a conflict, whether it be among the interests of a single individual or among the preferences of different individuals. Prall admits the existence of these conflicts between values,¹ yet apparently gives us a theory of criticism which cannot help in their solution.

We have seen that in the case of a clash of impulses within an individual, the satisfaction felt in the presence of intuited data seem to be as independent of each other as the data themselves,² and the greater satisfaction wins.³ Criticism is concerned with the expressing of this stronger liking, this preference, once it has been made; it is not concerned with the making of the preference. So in the case of conflicts between the preferences of different persons. The persons concerned may reason with one another, may argue, and pass many judgments. But if, during this process, some persons "change their minds" and shift their likings from one thing to another, it will be because in the course of the discussion, they happen to have had presented to their intuition, an idea which was more satisfying to contemplate than any which they had before. But the new satisfaction which follows upon the thinking and reasoning will be no different in nature from the previous satisfactions; the judgments which have conditioned the new enjoyment have not in any way affected its quality or character,⁴ which, as we have seen, is just as immediate and intrinsic as ever. Each man's

1. See above, p. 16.

2. For the isolated nature of the datum, see above, p. 11, footnote 4.

3. See above, p. 17.

4. See Prall, *Present Status*, p. 83, ". . . as fertilizer is not as such the fragrance of the rose whose growth it has induced, so in general the causes of things are not the character of things; our anthropoid ancestors were not man, and human values are not those judgments that causally condition them." See also *Naturalism and Norms*, p. 53, "everything that exists has a history and in addition to this and distinguishable from it, a character."

preference will be independent and absolute; and again, criticism will be the analysis of this preference; and will not have anything to do with its formation. Each man will express his own taste, his own motor-affective attitude, and there the matter will rest.¹

If Prall seems satisfied with such a state of affairs, it is because for him value is such an extremely individualistic matter. By this we do not mean merely that any value, to exist at all, must be experienced by an individual. In *this* sense, all relativists, who hold value to be dependent upon human experience, must hold it to be individual, since all experience belongs to individuals (unless we suppose an "over-individual" mind, such as that of the group, or of the Absolute; and this supposition is avoided by the writers with which we are dealing). But in Prall's theory, values may be said to be individual in a different sense.

They are individual in the sense that they concern only the individual himself, and involve no outside relations with other persons. For a theory which "finds value exclusively in a relation between a mind and its immediately felt datum,"² the most valuable objects will be those most satisfying to contemplate; that is, objects of beauty, whether in nature or in art. Now æsthetic contemplation does not consume or destroy its object, so objects of this kind can be enjoyed by many persons with a minimum of competition and necessary social contacts. Many of the beauties of art, and to even a greater extent, many of the beauties of nature, are free to all, and open to any individual to enjoy, regardless of the attitude of others. Moreover, the contemplation of beauty, as an

1. See Prall, *Study in Theory of Value*, p. 269, "our preference in all cases is simply a preference, based on nothing deeper or more fundamental, nothing more absolute or eternal, than just the nature of our motor-affective apparatus."

2. Prall, *Metaphysics and Value*, p. 123.

act, does not involve coöperation with others, or social relationships of any kind. Therefore, for Prall, value will have no typical and essential connection with this type of relationship.

Of course, relations with other persons will be, along with all other experiences, a part of the general conditions of values. It is also true that a social relationship may become an art,¹ and consequently an object of æsthetic contemplation; and that acts which have social or moral utility may at the same time be regarded as beautiful, and so be values.² But these cases are not typical. Morality, under Prall's system, as he himself says, becomes for the most part a negative matter,³ a question of avoiding things unpleasant to contemplate. It is individual (in our sense) rather than essentially social. He has little interest and little faith in the possibility of expanding and enriching experience through human contacts and in the benefit to be derived from mutual association and increased coöperation among men.

Indeed, even if such increased coöperation were desired, Prall's theory of criticism as the analysis of an immediate and purely personal preference, provides no means for securing it. For it gives us no method for the adjudication of conflicts between values. When there is such a conflict between the preferences felt by different persons, Prall is right in saying "there is here no court of appeals except force itself which does not settle

1. See Prall, *Esthetic Heresy*, p. 520, "Indeed the great satisfying content of [Spinoza's] own human life—and this of course was true too of Socrates—was friendship, an art we no longer cultivate."

2. See above, p. 14. Also *Study in Theory of Value*, pp. 200-201.

3. See Prall, *Esthetic Heresy*, p. 519, "Stealing or boasting or lying we shall refrain from in the end because these activities are not objects of satisfied contemplation to the well-trained man. And so we should dispose of most of the moralities. They are negatives, ways of acting ruled out of the lives of those who rationally contemplate human activity . . .," etc.

metaphysical questions.”¹ His theory of value leaves us, satisfactorily to him, with these preferences as ultimate. We shall consider later some of the implications of this conclusion.

1. Prall, *Metaphysics and Value*, p. 117.

CHAPTER III

Value as Constituted by Interest

We turn now to another relativistic theory of value, one similar to that of Prall, yet differing in several respects—the theory of R. B. Perry. This writer maintains, with Prall, a “bio-centric or psycho-centric theory of value,”¹ one that treats value entirely in terms of the motor-affective attitudes of organisms. This attitude he calls interest;² and value, as he defines it, “is that special character of an object which consists in the fact that an interest is taken in it.”³ What he conceives to be the nature of “interest” will determine his conception of the nature of value, and consequently of the nature of criticism. So it is to a study of interest that we must turn for our analysis.

Now interest is a motor-affective attitude, one of going towards or of seeking to preserve or appropriate, and, in the negative forms, of avoiding or of seeking to destroy⁴ (hereafter we shall speak only of positive interest, and leave the negative form to be understood). Prall also speaks of value as constituted by a motor-

1. R. B. Perry, *General Theory of Value*, 1926, p. 139. Hereafter to be referred to as *Theory*.

2. See Perry, *Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. 11 (1914), “The Definition of Value,” p. 149, “It is assumed with something approaching unanimity that value in the generic sense has to do with a certain constant that we may call bias or interest.”

3. Perry, *Theory*, p. 124. See also his *Moral Economy*, 1909, p. 11, and his article in *The New Realism*, 1912, esp. pp. 140-141. Also “The Definition of Value,” p. 153, “To like or dislike an object is to create that object’s value.”

4. See Perry, *Theory*, p. 115, “It is to this all-pervasive characteristic of motor-affective life, this *state, act, attitude or disposition of favor or disfavor*, to which we propose to give the name *interest*.”

affective attitude,¹ but his emphasis is to a great extent on the affective aspect, expressed by such terms as contemplation, intuition, feeling;² while Perry stresses, rather, the motor aspect, the actual urge towards action, which is more akin to desire than to contemplation. Indeed, Perry makes it clear that interest, as he uses the term, is not necessarily connected with feelings, which are sensory experiences peculiar only in being located very vaguely and as coming from within the body.³ Feelings may become the objects of interest, as they do when they are sought or avoided for their own sakes; or they may, and frequently do, accompany interest; but they are not the same as interest; and for Perry it is the interest, the active attitude, and not the feeling, which is the constitutive principle of value.

Although interest is an organic tendency, which has its roots far down in the scale of life, it gives rise to value primarily at the human level.⁴ For here interest is more than a mere tendency towards action; it is a *conscious* tendency. Found perhaps in some of the higher animals, but particularly characteristic of man, is "prospicience,"⁵ the capacity to act in the light of expectation, to anticipate, to be guided by the future. This ability to look ahead and to plan is, of course, cognitive in nature,⁶ and, therefore, it is impossible, Perry feels, to consider interest apart from cognition.

1. See above, Ch. 2, p. 12.

2. Though he makes them more active than they are in common usage, see above, Ch. 2, p. 12.

3. For Perry's whole theory of the nature of feeling, see *Theory*, pp. 276-293. It is typical that Perry should describe unalloyed bliss as "periods in which satisfaction is a continuous achievement, rather than a completed fulfillment," p. 251.

4. See *ibid.*, p. 180, "The living organism provides the context of interest, but until mind appears we do not recognize that specific type of organic complexity which is peculiarly characteristic of human behavior and whose diverse modes furnish the data of the science of value."

5. *Ibid.*

6. See *ibid.*, p. 182, "higher" forms of interest "clearly imply the capacity to form ideas, or to see the meanings of things and events," etc. Also pp. 176-179.

The expectation, in the light of which an interested person is acting, is a judgment. A judgment, as Perry analyzes it, has a tetradic structure: (1) the indication of (2) that of which something is judged, and (3) the predication of (4) an attribute to it. These factors are so related that "when a first response occurs, there is a second response called the predicative response, whose execution or non-execution begets fulfillment or surprise."¹ Now Perry holds the structure of interest to be similar to that of judgment; there is the act of indication with its index—that of which I desire something—and the act of predication with its predicate—the something which I desire of the index.² But the difference between interest and judgment is this: in the case of interest the act of predication, besides fulfilling the act of indication, is also congruent with a certain organic "set" or "governing propensity" which is in control of the agent at that time. This governing propensity predisposes the agent to the act of predication quite independently of the act of indication, and "the act of indication occurs owing to the prospective occurrence of the act of predication."³ He gives a clear example of this:

"To desire that there shall be money in my purse signifies that the act of dealing with money is in agreement with a governing propensity such as avarice or need, which predisposes me to its performance independently of my response to the purse. The opening of the purse, possessing the function of releasing the money response, may occur then because of this fact, or because of what is expected of it. If when I open the purse I see or handle money, my judgment is fulfilled because what I expected has happened; and my interest is satisfied because what happened also harmonizes with my governing propensity."⁴

Perry concludes, then, that: "while I can judge that there is money in my purse without desiring it, I cannot

1. Perry, *Theory*, p. 329.

2. See *ibid.*, p. 344.

3. *Ibid.*, p. 345. Also p. 183, "An act is interested so far as its occurrence is due to the agreement between its accompanying expectation and the unfulfilled phases of a governing propensity."

4. *Ibid.*, p. 345.

desire it without judging it.”¹ Interest and judgment are not the same, and may vary independently, as they frequently do, but nevertheless cognition is inherent in interest. Indeed it is essential to interest,² at least at the human level for here interest is actually defined as “prospicient adaptation,”³ and “response governed by an accompanying expectation.”⁴ This essential cognitive factor, which “mediates” the interest, is called by Perry the “interest-judgment.” It is an integral part of the interest situation itself, and is not to be confused with a “judgment of interest” (or “value”), which is an *ex post facto* judgment merely stating that interest did or did not exist in a given situation.⁵ Nor must we forget that while judgment is always present as a mediating factor, it is the interest itself, and not the judgment, which gives rise to the value and gives to an otherwise neutral object the character of “good.”

Let us turn now from a study of generic value, or the good, to what is for Perry a different topic entirely;⁶ namely, a study of comparative value, or the better. The better is the *more* good, and so the criterion of better involves the meaning of good, and over and above that the meaning of more. That is, the better object will have that character which we call goodness or value, and will have it in a greater amount than some other object has. For “more” means “greater in amount” to Perry, who agrees with Russell that “the comparative form in

1. Perry, *Theory*, p. 345.

2. See *ibid.*, p. 346, “This cognitive factor which is essential to interest as such, or which ‘mediates’ the interest as a whole, may be termed an interest-judgment.” Also p. 349, “All interests are mediated by an interest-judgment,” and p. 358, “It is true that he must be aware of the object of his interest in order that he shall be interested,” and p. 383, “Every interested act has a reason, for every interest has at least one mediating judgment, namely, the interest-judgment.”

3. *Ibid.*, p. 184.

4. *Ibid.*, p. 523.

5. See *ibid.*, pp. 362-365. See also above, Ch. 2, p. 21, esp. footnote 1.

6. See Perry, *Theory*, pp. 19, 20 and 595-598.

grammar is *prima facie* evidence of quantity.”¹ This does not mean a quantitative standard in the numerical sense, for instance, in the sense that one object is so many times as valuable as another, or more valuable by so many units; it means merely that values can be placed in an order or scale of preference.²

It is this preference which decides the place of the object in the value-scale; for in the same way that it is interest alone that gives rise to value, it is the amount of interest that determines the amount of value.³ The Hedonists’ error lay “not in proposing to measure the immeasurable, but in proposing to measure the wrong thing,”⁴ and Perry would substitute interest in place of pleasure as the element to be measured.⁵ A study of comparative value, then, is a study of the measurement of interests.

The standards by which Perry would measure interests are those of “intensity,” “preference” and “inclusiveness.”⁶ By the intensity of an interest he means the amount of command over the body possessed by the interest at that time, or, as he expresses it, “It is a ratio of the elements which are acting under the control of the interest to the totality of the elements of the organism.”⁷ By preference he means not the domination of one interest over another, but the choice by a single interest of one

1. Bertrand Russell, *Principles of Mathematics*, 1903, p. 170. Quoted by Perry, *Theory*, p. 599.

2. See Perry, *Theory*, p. 606, “When a subject knowing two pleasures takes the one and foregoes the other, he establishes between them the relation of ‘preferred to,’ or ‘better than’; and by extending the range of comparison he may create among all the pleasures which he knows a comprehensive order of preference within which each pleasure has its determinate relations and intervals of superiority and inferiority to all the rest.”

3. See *ibid.*, 599, “It is the interest which confers value on the object, and it must also be interest which confers the amount of the value.”

4. *Ibid.*, p. 608.

5. See *ibid.*, p. 609.

6. See *ibid.*, pp. 615 ff.

7. *Ibid.*, p. 630. See pp. 626-633.

of its eligible objects rather than another,¹ a choice which gives its object "betterness" regardless of the intensity of the interest. This standard has been a persistent and important one, advocated by the "cult of humanism," the unorthodox Utilitarianism of Mill, the views of Pater and other critics.² By inclusiveness he means the number of interests satisfied by the object. This standard is based on the whole-part relationship, on the fact that the whole always contains the part *and more*.³ Hence the object of two or more interests contains the value conferred by the first interest plus that conferred by the remaining, and in that sense is better than an object of only a single interest.⁴ The larger the number of interests fulfilled, the better.

These standards are independently variable, and because they represent the measurement, as it were, of different magnitudes,⁵ they are irreducible to any single scale. Nevertheless, there is an order in which they should be applied if they are to be applied jointly. Since intensity interferes with preference (for example, the intensely thirsty man is less capable of distinguishing good from bad wine), and the exercise of preference interferes with the integration of interests (through emphasis on *one* interest), the proper order of application is (1) inclusiveness, (2) preference, and (3) intensity. "A system of interests which shall be greatest in all three senses," he says, "can be achieved only by first achieving

1. See Perry, *Theory*, pp. 634-635, "That an interest exhibits preference among its eligible objects, or that these objects are more or less eligible, appears to be as fundamental a feature of interest as its having objects at all. Interest not only selects *its* objects from among the objects of the environment, but selects *among* its objects."

2. See *ibid.*, pp. 633-634. For Perry's agreement with Mill, see p. 606.

3. See *ibid.*, p. 646.

4. See *ibid.*, pp. 646-649. Also p. 134 and footnote, where a universe "said to *contain* value" is "better than no universe at all, by the principle of 'inclusiveness'."

5. See Perry's reference in his footnote, *Theory*, p. 615, to W. E. Johnson's *Logic*, pt. II, Ch. VII, "The Different Kinds of Magnitude."

a harmonious integration of all interests. Component interests being so compounded to realize the greatest inclusiveness, the resultant interests may then exercise preference, each choosing its 'best'; and having so chosen, each interest may then be brought to its maximum intensity."¹

The standard of inclusiveness is by far the most important of the three standards, for it alone is the basis of the superiority of the good which results from this "harmonious integration of all interests." This good is the "rational" good, the good brought about by the use of reason. For the integration of interests, whether on the personal or the social level, comes about through "a finding of new reasons, or the introduction of new mediating judgments,"² which is rationalization. "Whatever the form of conflict or weakness from which life suffers," Perry states, "the solution lies in developing new threads of mediation by which interests are directed in new ways upon common objects or upon each other. In this sense the process of constructive integration is always a process of rationalization."³ This new mediation is possible, of course, only because (as we have seen above) every interest at the human level is mediated by an "interest-judgment" to begin with; the new judgments merely make the mediation more complex.

In the case of personal integration, this mediation results in what Perry calls a "sort of 'vector sum',"⁴ a combination in which each interest "enters fully into the whole" and none is thwarted or negated.⁵ But this kind

1. Perry, *Theory*, pp. 657-658.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 386. For the whole question of rationalization, see pp. 383-399.

3. *Ibid.*, pp. 512-513.

4. *Ibid.*, p. 662, "Then there occurs a process which may by analogy be described as a process of moral or personal composition, or a sort of 'vector sum'."

5. *Ibid.*, pp. 686-687.

of unity is not sufficient for the achievement of a harmonious society; what is needed is "*personal* integration that shall be *socially qualified*."¹ Such integration is to be brought about by the same means; i. e., by the use of reflection in the form of mediating judgments.² The important form of mediation in this case is love or benevolence, which Perry defines as "the mediation of an interest by a judgment of interest when the fulfillment of a second interest is the object of the desire or liking of a first,"³ that is, an interest in what is judged to be the interest (in this case) of another person. The ultimate result of this principle, if carried out thoroughly, would be "an all-inclusive and harmonious system of interests."⁴ It is by the standard of inclusiveness that the object of this system of interests, "the object which satisfies all individuals, when individuals are both personally integrated and harmoniously associated,"⁵ may be called "the supreme good."

In this treatment of comparative value, Perry differs in several ways from the Utilitarians. He disagrees with their theory that happiness is the only thing desired,⁶ and that it is pleasure rather than the desire for pleasure which creates value.⁷ He substitutes the more dynamic concepts of impulses and "governing propensities" for the older concept of "mental states," and he sets out to measure interest instead of pleasure. Nevertheless, his theory is like theirs in a very fundamental way. Like

1. Perry, *Theory*, p. 676.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 383, "All modes of integration are *achieved* or *created* in the personal or social life, by acts of mediation."

3. *Ibid.*, p. 665. For the detailed difference in the forms which mediation takes in personal and social integration, see pp. 674-677.

4. *Ibid.*, p. 659.

5. *Ibid.*, pp. 686-687. For the unique significance of the standard of inclusiveness, see also p. 656, "... all-commensurability is best only as judged by the standard of inclusiveness." Also p. 659, "the only standard by which a greatest good can be comprehensively defined."

6. See *ibid.*, p. 119.

7. *Ibid.*, pp. 608-609.

them, he believes it is possible to find a something which can be measured, and which, when measured, will give an accurate indication of the value of objects. He is able to give directions for the drawing up of a scale of values; and like the Utilitarians, with their "greatest good of the greatest number," he is able to define for us the apex of that scale, the *Summum Bonum*.

In both of these empirical systems, the standards of value are found by us through an analysis of men's desires and not from any super-natural source; in that sense they are not external to experience. Nevertheless, it may be noted that in any particular case where a value is to be judged upon, the standards used are external to that situation; they have already been analyzed out by thought and are ready to be applied. In this sense, in the sense that he believes thought capable of evolving standards to be applied to all subsequent situations,¹ Perry may be called a rationalist. His view contrasts with that of Prall, according to which, in each new case, preference, in the last analysis, is ultimate and is, so to speak, its own standard.

So far we have not mentioned criticism as such. But when we attempt to find out what implications this theory of generic and comparative value has for a theory of criticism, we find a further complication. In the previous analysis of generic value, we saw that an act of valuing involves two distinct things, an interest and an interest-judgment. Because these two are kept so distinct in Perry's theory of value, there will be two kinds of criticism, two kinds of standards to be applied.² One

1. Except those in which a deadlock occurs between interests measured by the same standard. See below, p. 40, esp. footnote 1. Also Perry, *Theory*, pp. 626-658, on "The Commensurability of Value."

2. See *ibid.*, p. 612, "In other words, there are two fundamental methods of criticism, the corrective method and the quantitative; the first expressed in the judgment 'this value is founded on truth or error' and the second expressed in the judgment, 'this value is greater or less'."

kind we have already spoken of; namely, the standards of comparative value, which are to be applied in the measurement of the interests involved; the other, to which we now turn, is the standard of correctness, to be applied to the judgment which mediates the interest.¹ For the interest-judgment, like any other, is either true or false, and, as a judgment, must be subject to this standard.

What is the relation of this standard of correctness to the question of value? According to Perry's theory, the standard of correctness, since it is not quantitative or comparative, is not concerned with the amount of interest, and, therefore, is not concerned with the amount of value. "To judge an interest to be correct or incorrect does not in any sense predicate more or less of the interest, and thus does not in any sense predicate better or worse of its object."² Interest depends upon belief, not upon knowledge,³ and so long as a judgment is believed to be true, the interest which it mediates will remain, and consequently the value conferred by the interest will remain. It follows that objects will be "*none the less* valuable"⁴ because of the interest being founded on a false judgment.

Yet there is this point to be noticed. An interest based on error will remain only so long as the error is not discovered. When the falseness of the judgment is recognized, the mediated interest vanishes. Consequently, Perry admits that the mistaken interest is "unstable" and "precarious," while "a value founded on truth is not only wisely and rightly founded, as judged by cognitive standards, but is *securely* founded."⁵ It is for this reason

1. See Perry, *Theory*, pp. 611-615.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 612.

3. See *ibid.*, p. 604, footnote, "Value is conditioned by the occurrence of an interest-judgment, but not by the truth of that judgment. It is a function of belief rather than of knowledge."

4. *Ibid.*, p. 614.

5. *Ibid.*, p. 615.

that Perry includes correctness among his standards of criticism; that is, among the methods by which "values may be critically compared."¹ Criticism of this type means the testing and revising of old judgments, "the discrediting of old interests based on obsolete belief, and the formation of new interests based on advancing knowledge."² It is a type of criticism "widely employed," Perry says, "more widely, perhaps, than any other,"³ in the fields, for instance, of morals, economics, æsthetics and religion.

Perry has attempted to keep the two kinds of standards, based on the distinction between the interest and the interest-judgment, quite distinct.⁴ But that the two types are not as separable as he would have us believe seems to follow from his own treatment of them. When he says that the correction of interest as a method of criticism gives rise to interests that are "wisely and rightly founded," he has introduced a norm of comparative value right there, for presumably these well-founded interests are "better" than their opposites. The value of an interest, therefore, seems to be dependent in a very fundamental way on the thought that has mediated the interest. If this were not so, the "correction" of interest would simply be a "shift" in interest; and this most widely employed standard, would be irrelevant to value, and would be totally unable to give us "good" judgment or "good" taste, whether in art, morals, or any other field. That changes in judgments can make a difference not only in the interest but in the value of the interest, suggests a closer relation between the judgment and the interest than Perry will admit.

1. Perry, *Theory*, p. 604.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 615.

3. *Ibid.*

4. See above, p. 36, footnote 2.

On the other hand, the dependence of comparative value on cognition seems no less evident in those inclusive, rational values achieved through "constructive integration." This process depends, as we have seen, on the use of rationalization or reflection, not merely to suppress some interests at the expense of others, or to compromise between them, but to form *new* interests.¹ The process is, according to Perry, not only constructive, but creative.² This would suggest that thought is related to interest not only as cause but as constituent, and that both were therefore involved in the nature of value. But Perry will have none of this. Though every interest is *mediated* by judgment, "value is not conferred by the judgment, but by the supervening interest."³ "Nor does the object acquire value from being judged or expected as an effect, but only from the fact that this expectation moves one to act. In neither case, therefore, can it properly be said that value is conferred on an object by the act of judgment."⁴

This distinction is as thorough as the similar one made by Prall.⁵ Yet the conclusions of the two theories are very different. Whereas Prall continues to treat value entirely in terms of the motor-affective factor and to identify valued objects primarily with objects of æsthetic contemplation,⁶ Perry emphasizes the rational factor and places highest those values which depend upon cognition.

1. See Perry, *Theory*, p. 386, "The result of rationalization is often to create a new end which is distinguished by its integrative character . . .," etc.

2. See *ibid.*, p. 383, "all modes of integration are *achieved* or *created* in the personal or social life, by acts of mediation." (Italics are his) Also p. 386, "Such ends, or ideal constructive ideals, are both synthetic and creative."

3. See *ibid.*, p. 123.

4. *Ibid.*, p. 124.

5. See Ch. 2, p. 19, and footnote 3.

6. See Ch. 2, p. 10, and pp. 19, 20, on art.

Without this, sheer conflict would remain,¹ and Perry is more interested than Prall in eliminating conflicts. For to Perry, the greater goods are social and not individual in their nature.² The "good will" is "a personal will socially directed and socially multiplied";³ and the highest good, as we have seen, would be "an all-inclusive and harmonious system of interests."⁴

In this ideal, Perry shows an interest of his own, almost entirely absent in Prall—an interest in unity as such. Prall, indeed, desires what social harmony is necessary for the attainment of satisfactions, but he draws no such unified picture as Perry's all-inclusive system. This difference in the attitudes of the two men is due, perhaps, to the difference in the fields of interest from which they approach the problem of value-theory. Prall comes primarily from the field of æsthetics,⁵ Perry from that of morals. Now artistic creation and appreciation, as we have mentioned before, is to a great extent an individual or non-social matter, involving only a minimum of coöperation between individuals.⁶ Morality, on the other hand, particularly as Perry views it,⁷ is based in

1. See Perry, *Theory*, p. 640, "When, in other words, all cognitive differences have been eliminated or discounted, and two preferences still conflict, we are confronted with two undeniable facts, both of which have to be accepted by both parties, the facts namely, that whereas in the last analysis I prefer b to a, you prefer a to b."

2. This distinction is to be taken in the sense explained in Ch. 2, p. 25.

3. Perry, *Theory*, p. 685.

4. *Ibid.*, p. 659.

5. For Perry's attitude towards art, so different from Prall's, see his criticism of art from a moral point of view in his *The Moral Economy*, pp. 171-213; also his slight treatment of art in his *General Theory of Value*; and the criticism of this treatment in Prall's review of that book, in the *International Journal of Ethics*, Vol. 38 (1927), pp. 116-121, and F. C. S. Schiller's review of the same book, in *Mind*, Vol. 37 (1928), p. 99.

6. See Ch. 2, pp. 25-26; also Perry's *Moral Economy*, p. 192, "the æsthetic interest is resourceful, easily supplying itself with the objects which it uses. It follows that it contributes to independence, being like the 'speculative activity' of Aristotle in giving the individual a means of happiness in himself without the aid of his fellows."

7. See his whole treatment of morality in *The Moral Economy*, especially p. 15, "The fulfillment of a simple interest is good, but only *the fulfillment of an organization of interests* is morally good," and p. 13, "Through morality a plurality of interests become an *economy* or *community of interests*." (Italics are his)

a very fundamental way on social organization and integration. Thus, in contrast to Prall's interest in individual, momentary and rather piece-meal satisfactions, Perry's interest in moral values leads him to the construction of a *scale* of values, culminating in complete harmony as the Supreme Good.

From this it can be seen why the rational factor is of so much greater importance to Perry's theory than to Prall's. Yet it is difficult to see why Perry, when cognition is so essential to his system of values, should cling so tenaciously to the separation of the cognitive and the motor-affective factors. The reason that he, with ideals so different from those of Prall, maintains this same distinction as his basis, is to be found in his double allegiance. As a relativist he wishes to make value dependent upon the attitude of the organism, but as an epistemological realist, he is anxious to keep value independent of thought. Thought is to "cognize" value, and, therefore, it can in no sense "constitute" it.¹ Yet the facts that even the most elementary human interest involves propiscience and that all the higher values, resulting from criticism, depend upon reflection, would suggest that value itself is determined as much by the cognitive part as by the motor-affective part of the total interest, and, therefore, cannot be defined in terms of the motor-affective element alone.

1. See Perry, "The Definition of Value," pp. 152-154, esp. 152, "It appears to be clear that interest cannot be at the same time constitutive and cognitive of value." So it is interest that constitutes, thought that cognizes, value.

CHAPTER IV

Value as Enjoyed Meanings

We turn now to our third relativistic theory of value, Dewey's theory of value as enjoyed meanings. Our first analysis must be that of the interpretation of "enjoyment" essential to this theory. In both the organic and the inorganic worlds there is what we may call selective activity,¹ which, in the lower forms of life, appears as merely motor discharge called out by some stimulus. That is, on this level, though the activity is directed towards a specific object, the response is not being made to that object as an object, but rather to the particular stimulus that called it forth. In other words, the organism is in no way conscious of the object towards which the response is made.

But when on a higher level, Dewey holds, we find the affective or emotional element entering, we find involved the *perception* of the object.² A person, that is, does not have an enjoyment or a liking "uberhaupt"; the liking is always directed towards some object recognized as an object. This recognition, which is perception, is consciousness of the qualities, that is, the immanent meanings, of the object. For to Dewey, qualities are meanings—relationships of the object to other objects and events—which are no longer explicit but have become "condensed" as it were, into the characteristics of the object itself. "Immanent meaning," he says, ". . . marks potentialities

1. See John Dewey, *Experience and Nature*, Chicago, 1925, pp. 253-254.

2. See Dewey, "Value, Objective Reference and Criticism." *Philosophical Review*, Vol. 34, p. 323.

already or previously so realized as to have become 'funded' or incorporated in the object enjoyed. Any familiar noun, or the object of which it applies—table, chair, acorn—gives an illustration."¹

In this type of experience there is no reflection, no explicit consciousness of the several relationships of the object; that is, the object is taken in an immediate and unanalyzed experience and is not considered in relation to anything else. Consequently, the object is not considered either as a means or as an end, since they are both relationships. The object is liked in and for itself, and the enjoyment is in so far intrinsic. Now this type of enjoyment might be called "æsthetic," if the word is taken as synonymous with immediate or consummatory; but the meaning would differ fundamentally from the meaning Prall gives to the word "æsthetic." For Prall's æsthetic experience, as we have seen, is a bare intuition or feeling; while Dewey believes it impossible to isolate a feeling such as liking from the recognition of the object liked, and this recognition contains inherently, though implicitly, just those factors of relationship which Prall definitely excludes from æsthetic experience.² Because of his theory of qualities as immanent meanings, Dewey is able to say that there is no enjoyment without an ideational element, i. e., meaning, and at the same time say that this kind of enjoyment is an immediate, consummatory, and not a reflective experience.³

1. Dewey, in an unpublished manuscript. See also his reference in *Experience and Nature*, p. 361, to "immanent and directly enjoyed meaning."

2. See above, Ch. 2, p. 11, especially footnote 4, and p. 12, footnote 1.

3. For the distinction between immanent and referential meaning, see his distinction between sense and signification, in *Experience and Nature*, p. 261. "Sense is also different from signification. The latter involves use of a quality as a sign or index of something else, as when the red of a light signifies danger, and the need of bringing a moving locomotive to a stop. The sense of a thing, on the other hand, is an immediate and immanent meaning; it is meaning which is itself felt or directly had." See also his distinction between direct and indirect understanding, in *How We Think*, New York, 1910, pp. 118-120. On p. 120 he refers to the two processes as "apprehension" and "comprehension."

So far we have not mentioned value. For Dewey, in direct contrast both to Prall and to Perry, does not believe value to enter into this type of experience at all. Nor would value *ever* enter so long as enjoyment remained at this level where it is possessed and not questioned. But it is clear that it cannot remain unquestioned for long. The natural instability of all experience due to change and the flux of circumstance makes enjoyments too precarious and fugitive to continue long unchallenged. "Exposed to all the contingencies of existence" they are "as unstable as the forms of clouds."¹ There is, moreover, a continuous change going on in ourselves; our likes and dislikes wax and wane, due to the fickleness and "infinite flippancy of the natural man."² There is also the inevitable conflict between the enjoyments themselves, and between present enjoyments and their painful after-effects. "First and immature experiences is content simply to enjoy. But a brief course in experience enforces reflection; it requires but a brief time to teach that some things sweet in the having are bitter in after-taste and in what they lead to. Primitive innocence does not last. Enjoyment ceases to be a datum and becomes a problem."³

When this occurs, when the enjoyment of an object becomes uncertain or unsatisfactory because of change and conflict, it is necessary to choose whether to let go in favor of some other object, or to strive to hang on to it. A choice of this kind requires comparison, and so objects are no longer had in an immediate way but are compared as to their conditions and consequences for the purpose of appraisal. This process of making explicit the relationships of the object to other things, in other

1. Dewey, *Experience and Nature*, p. 399.

2. *Ibid.*

3. *Ibid.*, p. 398.

words, of expanding its immanent meanings into referential meanings, is reflection.¹ It is made possible, of course, only by the fact that immanent meanings are an essential part of the original experience, the enjoyment having always been the enjoyment of a definite object which as an object had potential consequences and relations.

In considering the conditions and the consequences of an object, a distinction is made for the first time between means and end. The object is no longer enjoyed in and for itself, but is considered as a means to further results.² It is the desirability of these results that will determine the desirability of the object in question. Now, how is the desirability of the results to be determined? This is the main issue in Dewey's theory of value.

As is always the case in reflection, there is an "end" in the sense of a limit or terminus to thought—the wider situation within which is felt the incompleteness that made thought necessary, and which will be completed by the thinking. This field within which the problem arose is beyond the present thought; it is for the time being unquestioned. What is to be determined by thought is which choice to make in order to bring to a close the present unsatisfactory situation. What must be decided, and therefore what is deliberated on, is the end-in-view or the aim to be chosen as a means to removing the obstacles and thus liberating activity within the wider, unquestioned field.³ That which makes the chosen means

1. See Dewey, *Experience and Nature*, p. 397, "Thought goes beyond immediate existence to its relationships, the conditions which mediate it and the things to which it is in turn mediatory."

2. See Dewey, *Democracy and Education*, New York, 1921, p. 280, "Things judged or passed upon have to be estimated in relation to some third thing, some further end. With respect to that, they are means."

3. See Dewey, *Essays in Experimental Logic*, Chicago, 1916, p. 273, "This is the doctrine of Aristotle when he says we never deliberate about ends but only about means. That is to say, in all deliberation (or practical judgment or inquiry) there is always something outside of judgment which fixes its beginning and end or terminus."

"desirable" is their effectiveness in accomplishing this.

That which, after due consideration of causes and consequences, is chosen as the "desirable" or "better," becomes *the good* of that particular situation.¹ Here we have for the first time a *value*, something deliberately chosen or preferred as better or more desirable than its alternatives. It should be noted that "preference" of this type is fundamentally different from "preference" in the sense used by Prall and Perry,² where it is something ultimate and immediate. Here preference is the using of intelligence to decide an issue; it is the drawing of a new conclusion as regards what is good when the problematic or indeterminate character of the situation requires a new solution. The value established by thought is therefore a new value. "In this process," Dewey says, "things *get* values—something they did not have before, although they had their efficiencies."³

Reflection, then, according to this theory, in determining what shall be taken as the better in any particular situation, plays a peculiarly creative role.⁴ It accepts the factors which are not at the moment questioned—the objects and their relations, and enjoyments previously felt; but these are "*not* determinate values. They are not *objects of valuation*; they are *data for a valuation*."⁵ Reflection, in establishing the new value, makes use of them, but must determine what influence, what importance they shall have. The thinking that determines this is a

1. See Dewey, *Experience and Nature*, p. 62, "To be good is to be better than." See also *Human Nature and Conduct*, New York, 1922, p. 278, "The better is the good; the best is not better than the good but is simply the discovered good," etc.

2. See above, Ch. 2, p. 17, and Ch. 3, pp. 32-33.

3. Dewey, *Essays*, etc., p. 368.

4. See Dewey, "Value and Experimental Knowledge," *Philosophical Review*, Vol. 31, p. 333, "Creative function is denied [by his critics] to judgment as such," and his footnote on the same page, "It would perhaps have conduced to understanding if instead of using the adjective 'instrumental' to characterize judgment in its logical aspect, the term 'creational' had been used."

5. Dewey, *Essays*, etc., p. 363.

"judgment of what and how to judge—of the weight to be assigned to various factors in the determination of judgment."¹ From the nature of the case, there can be no ready-made standards to apply; thought must find its criteria within the situation itself, it must set up a new standard, a new value, that will complete the incomplete situation and in that way bring about satisfaction.

"Cognitive experience arises from, exists for the sake of, and dips again in, non-cognitive experience,"² so that at the conclusion of the reflective process we have again the immediate experience of enjoyment. Now the object chosen by reflection as good, may happen to be the same as that previously enjoyed, or it may be "a new object found which will combine (harmonize) otherwise incompatible enjoyments."³ But in any case, the enjoyment which follows reflection will differ from that which preceded because of the added meanings which have been given the object through that process of reflection. Meanings again are immanent rather than referential; they become again the qualities of the object rather than its distinct conditions and consequences. But because through reflection these relationships have been recognized and expanded, the meanings which enter after reflection into the quality of the object are wider and deeper. They are deeper because of their inclusion of thought-out relationships; they are wider because they are the result of a comparison among objects and thus include the meanings of the rejected objects as well as those of the chosen.⁴ Since immanent meanings make up the ex-

1. Dewey, *Essays, etc.*, pp. 269-270.

2. T. V. Smith, "Dewey's Theory of Value." *Monist*, Vol. 32, p. 343.

3. Dewey, from an unpublished manuscript.

4. Dewey, from an unpublished manuscript. He recognizes, however, that knowledge of the consequences and hence of the value of the rejected objects is limited by the fact of their rejection. See his agreement with Costello's criticism in his "Valuation and Experimental Knowledge," *Philosophical Review*, Vol. 31, pp. 347-348.

perienced qualities of the object, and since the enjoyment gets *its* quality from the experienced qualities, the enjoyment that results from reflection will be "enhanced" or enriched. This is what gives *value*, as contrasted with mere enjoyment, its peculiar quality and importance. In Dewey's own words,

"The new value, dependent upon judgment, is when it comes, as immediate a good or bad as anything can be. But it is also an immediate value of a *plus* sort. The prior judgment has affected the new good, not merely as its casual condition, but by entering into its quality. The new good has an added dimension of value . . . A crude, undeveloped person and a man of cultivated taste may both derive an immediate value from a picture. But they hardly have the same in actual quality."¹

This difference between what is enjoyed "casually" and accidentally and previous to all reflection, and that which is enjoyed as the result of reflection, is well brought out, Dewey believes, in the difference between the meanings of such terms as "enjoyed" and "enjoyable," "desired" and "desirable," "satisfying" and "satisfactory," "loved" and "lovable," "blamed" and "blameworthy," "objected to" and "objectionable," "admired" and "admirable";² as well as in such terms as "eaten" and "edible."³ In each pair the first word states a fact, the second word asserts a relation between an object and an attitude to be taken towards it. For example, an object that is desirable is not merely as a matter of fact desired, but is *to be* desired. The word thus points towards the future,⁴ and suggests that it is, so to speak, *safe* to desire that object. Thus the experience of an object recognized as desirable has an added validity not possessed by the object merely desired; and it is this sense of validity that

1. Dewey, "Value and Experimental Knowledge," *Philosophical Review*, Vol. 31, pp. 328-329.

2. Dewey, *The Quest for Certainty*, New York, 1929, pp. 260-261.

3. *Ibid.*, p. 266.

4. *Ibid.*, pp. 260-261.

gives value-objects that "plus" quality of which Dewey speaks.¹

The value which is established, is, then, according to Dewey, the joint product of thought and liking.² Since the valuable object is the one chose, *preferred*, it must be satisfying in the present situation, or it would not have been so chosen. As an object of immediate, but mature enjoyment, it will remain satisfying until it is perhaps questioned at some future time. If we should ask *why* this reflective good is better than the non-reflective, we have already questioned its goodness, and are again in a problematic situation as regards what is valuable. That is, when we ask about the *value* of a value, we are asking about its conditions and consequences; in order to find out whether this "value" is valuable, we must subject it to reflective inquiry just as we would any other object whose previously accepted goodness is called into question.

It is not hard to see what criticism is under this theory; it is that very process of which we have been speaking, that reflecting upon objects previously enjoyed or previously valued in order to reappraise them and to establish a new value. It is judgment, applied to the enjoyments and goods of life,³ in order that the goods may be richer and more secure. It is, therefore, synonymous with the process of valuation, the process of

1. Dewey, *The Quest for Certainty*, p. 267, "Enjoyments that issue from conduct directed by insight into relations have a meaning and a validity due to the way in which they are experienced . . . Even in the midst of direct enjoyment, there is a sense of validity, of authorization, which intensifies the enjoyment . . . To find a thing enjoyable is, so to speak, a *plus* enjoyment."

2. See Dewey, "Values, Liking and Thought," *Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. 20, p. 618, "I hold that thought as well as liking, an affective thought or a thoughtful affection is always the condition of the occurrence of Value-things." Also, "The Meaning of Value," *Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. 22, p. 120, "I state as explicitly as possible that I regard liking as an indispensable ingredient or constituent in those situations which have value-quality, but not as a *sufficient* ingredient or constituent."

3. See Dewey, *Experience and Nature*, p. 398, "Judgment is appropriately termed criticism wherever the subject-matter of discrimination concerns goods or values."

establishing a new value. Thus in Dewey's system, theory of value and theory of criticism coincide; to value is to appraise, the good is the better—neither can be accounted for except in terms of the other. And the aim of criticism is to enable us to enjoy "immediately" things which are "good," that is, whose consequences have been tested by thought.¹

As experience shifts constantly back and forth between the immediate and the reflective type, criticism varies in degree, from the slightest moment of doubt and reassurance to a prolonged and conscious examination. In all enjoyments, except the original and extremely immature, there are the results of prior reflection—meanings due to the expansion of earlier meanings.² And while a distinction may profitably be made between experience which tends to be immediate and consummatory, with a minimum of cognition, and experience in which reflection is the predominating characteristic, most of our conscious life is a combination of the two. This combination is found in "appreciation" or "enhanced enjoyment," and in the swift alteration of the two types, which Dewey, borrowing James' phrase, likens to "the constant rhythm of 'perchings and flights'."³

Thus we see that formal criticism makes conscious and explicit the factor of appraisal found in ordinary experience. If this were not so, criticism would be "the most willful of undertakings";⁴ it is "reasonable and to the point in the degree to which extends and deepens these factors of intelligence found in immediate taste and en-

1. See Dewey, *Experience and Nature*, p. 204, "The part of wisdom . . . is to make the immediately satisfying object the object which will also be most fertile."

2. See *ibid.*, p. 401, "after the first dumb, formless experience of a thing as a good, subsequent perception of the good contains at least a germ of criticism." These first and entirely immature enjoyments are so infrequent that Dewey often unreservedly calls *all* likings "immediate values."

3. *Ibid.*, p. 400.

4. *Ibid.*, p. 401.

joyment.”¹ This is a contrast to any theory which defines value in terms of a motor-affective attitude, exclusive of an intellectual factor, to which standards of criticism resulting from thought are applied ready-made. Such a theory, Dewey believes, by making criticism external to valuing, robs it of its validity. “The conception,” he says, “that mere liking is adequate to constitute a value situation makes no provision for the education and cultivation of taste, and renders criticism, whether æsthetic moral or logical, arbitrary and absurd.”² Criticism must not be an external standard, but “an outgrowth of a factor already contained in the value situation.”³

Because, as we have seen, criticism begins when previously accepted values prove unsatisfactory and the need for a new value is felt, criticism is never the application of a standard already determined. The function of intelligence is to create out of the factors of the situation itself a new standard which will be relevant to, and bring to a satisfactory close, this particular situation. Of course, in recurring and in similar situations, decisions become generalized, and these generalized decisions may act, until they are in turn questioned, as guide-posts in the process of reflection.⁴ But the problem of when they should be questioned is one of the problems of intelligence; reflection must determine to what extent past criteria are relevant for this situation.

We have here an attitude very different from that for instance of Perry. According to Perry, as we have seen, standards (such as intensity and inclusiveness) may be found by analysis, standards which when applied in any concrete case, will give us the “better.” On that

1. Dewey, *Experience and Nature*, p. 401.

2. Dewey, “The Meaning of Value,” *Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. 22, p. 131.

3. *Ibid.*

4. Dewey, in an unpublished manuscript. See also *Essays, etc.*, p. 385.

same scheme, values may be placed in a series or scale, until we reach at the top the Supreme Good.¹ It is characteristic of Dewey's attitude not only that he does not draw up any such scale, but that he believes it would be foreign to the very nature of value to do so. To apply a fixed standard, no matter how carefully thought out that standard might be, is not to make a genuine judgment,² not to resolve an incomplete situation; therefore it is not to establish a *value* at all.

It follows that while values resulting from extensive criticism are more secure than others, no values are permanent; all are liable to further criticism for the very reason that they themselves are the result of such procedure.³ This fact of liability to future alteration through reflection should be taken into account in determining the value. Much as the scientist might say of an experiment, "Perform it in such a way that the results may be checked up or revised by further experiments," so Dewey says of making the choice that establishes a value, "Mind your alternatives, and mind them in such a way that the act conditioned by the judgment [i. e., the choice] will secure the maximum of testing possible under the circumstances and also the maximum of ready reappraisal."⁴ Continuous intelligent inquiry is the only sure means we have of expanding and extending the values we have found; it alone can be counted on to give us goods which are "valid for thought, right for conduct and cultivated for appreciation."⁵

1. See above, Ch. 3, pp. 35-36.

2. Dewey, *Essays, etc.*, p. 374, "The standard of valuation is formed in the process of practical judgment or valuation. It is not something taken from outside and applied within it—such application means there is no judgment." See also p. 381.

3. See Dewey, "Value and Experimental Knowledge," *Philosophical Review*, Vol. 31, p. 349, "Any experiment involves a new risk in the very process of resolving a prior doubt."

4. *Ibid.*

5. Dewey, *Experience and Nature*, p. 407.

But in saying this we are not establishing a set criterion, for the use of intelligence is not a standard but a method of approach. Indeed, philosophy itself is a method, according to Dewey; for philosophy is for him criticism in a generalized form.¹ It is "this critical operation and function become aware of itself and its implications, pursued deliberately and systematically,"² "the critical method of developing methods of criticism."³ This insistence of Dewey's on going ahead step by step, this refusal to set up anything as an external and absolute norm, is based on his belief in "the power of common life to develop its own regulative methods and to furnish from within itself adequate goals, ideals and criteria."⁴ It is the distinguishing feature of his philosophic attitude.

1. Dewey, *Experience and Nature*, p. 398, "Philosophy is inherently criticism, having its distinctive position among various modes of criticism in its generality; a criticism of criticisms, as it were."

2. *Ibid.*, p. 403.

3. *Ibid.*, p. 437.

4. *Ibid.*, p. 38.

CHAPTER V

Some Implications Examined

We have dealt with the outstanding difference in the part played by cognition in the value-theories of these three men, and we can now see clearly the effect of this difference upon the point mentioned in Chapter I, the question of the extent to which criticism grows out of the value concept employed and the consequent capacity of the criticism to throw light on the conflict between values and hence on the solving of actual problems.

Prall, defining value in terms of enjoyment or intuition, quite distinct from cognition, can, of course, have no criticism (as we have been using the term) growing inherently out of the valuing-process itself. Each case of valuing, being purely a motor-affective attitude, is, in a sense, absolute. Comparative value, being sheer preference, is equally motor-affective, and equally absolute; while criticism, being in the sense he uses the term the analysis of a value already had, has no power to "improve," that is to increase the value of, a value. The effect of this theory would seem to make whatever values happen to exist the final word, and to make all comparison of values impossible. If Prall does not seem to do this—if he speaks of "mature" likes and dislikes, of "adequate" and "expert" valuing—it is because he has introduced standards of criticism from a different realm entirely, that of perception and cognition. Strictly speaking, likings can be neither better nor worse; but observation, perception and knowledge, can be acute or dull, broad or narrow, accurate or inaccurate, etc., and on these grounds

can be judged and compared. But these characteristics of acuteness, breadth, accuracy, etc., are, of course, never "better" unless they are actually preferred to their opposites, so that in the end we are thrown back onto whatever sheer preferences happen to exist for our ultimate criterion.

Prall's theory, then, places values in a realm outside appraisal or questioning, and thus removes them beyond the clash which makes questioning necessary. For the situation which calls for this type of criticism is, as we have noted, a conflict between values; and once values themselves have been placed outside discussion, no amount of arguing over acuteness of perception, etc., can really solve the problem. The only alternative is to let the strongest preference, or the strongest man, win.

Now Prall, being a relativist, is anxious to keep values close to human experience and to reject all ideas of value as something superior or external to human beings. But the effect of his theory seems to be just that which he does not desire, for, by raising values to a plane above criticism, he gives them a position external to the conflicts of actual human experience much as would an absolutistic theory. If, according to Prall's theory, values are given to man not by some greater Will or by the nature of objects in the external world, but by his own nature, they are none the less *given*, and in that sense are absolute. The only meaning Prall can give to that which "should" be liked is that which the most men prefer. The normal in the sense of the usual is used as the norm; what men by nature do like is the final standard. Consequently, the result of applying this theory would be to strengthen the status quo rather than to aid in clearing up confusions due to conflicts between values. And a theory of criticism which is unable to throw light on the solution of the

problems men face is almost as far removed from life as an absolutistic theory, admittedly independent of human experience.

We have found that Perry likewise has no standards of criticism developing inherently out of his concept of value. For, as he states, his standards of criticism are in addition to, and entirely different from, his standard of value. Whether, as in the case of correctness, the standard applies to the mediating judgment and not to the value itself, or, as in the case of the other standards, they apply to the *measurement* of the interest, they are always external to the interest as such and hence to the value as such. Perry's standards of criticism are found from an analysis of experience; but once found, they are as absolute as those of the most absolutistic theory. That is, when applied to a specific value, they are completely external to the value in question; they were found by a former analysis and are now applied in this situation in an entirely unquestioned way.

That Perry's theory does not lead, as does Prall's, to the placing of values outside the realm of conflict, is due to the fact that he does not as a matter of fact keep the two processes of valuing and thinking so separate. He continually and consistently maintains the distinction in terms, it is true; but as we have seen, in his actual treatment of value, cognition becomes such an intimate and essential part of interest that it all but enters into the constitution of the value created by the interest. The mediating judgment is so inevitable a part of any interest, and the process of rationalization so important for the highest type of value—the "inclusive" good—that his insistence on defining value in terms of interest to the exclusion of cognition is of theoretical rather than practical importance; and the distinction would perhaps

not be so rigorously maintained if it were not, as we have previously suggested, that as an epistemological realist, he must keep the object of cognition independent of the knower, even though he make the value dependent on the attitude of the agent. It is this cognitive element, almost inherent in the valuing process, which gives him his sole grounds for those standards of criticism, namely, correctness and inclusiveness, that can judge between the values of different persons. In the standard of inclusiveness particularly, where rationalization plays such an important part, we can see the dependence of social values on the factor of cognition, meaning by social values, values created by the harmonious integration of the interests of different persons. Perry, then, in his treatment of the standard of inclusiveness and the process of harmonizing interests, gives us a method of resolving conflicts between values, and thus throws light, in a way that Prall does not, on the solution of social problems.

While Perry and Prall, therefore, start from the same position—having value created by a process distinct from cognition—they arrive at very different conclusions. Perry, because of his social and moral interests, that is his interest in social coöperation and harmony, is led to emphasize the factor of cognition which brings about agreement and integration of interests, while Prall, because of his interest in æsthetic values, is led to emphasize more momentary and individualistic values. Thus the two men, starting from theories similar in many respects, arrive at conclusions whose differences seem due to a fundamental difference in attitude of life.

The conclusions of Dewey are closer in spirit to those of Perry than to those of Prall, for Dewey's interests, like

Perry's, are in social and moral issues and hence in the integration and harmonization of conflicting values. But he comes to these conclusions from premises very different from those of the other two men, because, as we have seen, value for Dewey is created not by a motor-affective attitude but only by *intelligent* enjoyment. His theory, unlike the other two, introduces no standards external to the valuing process itself; values are criticized and revised by the very same process by which they were created, namely, the expansion of meanings. For meanings give us both "enhanced" enjoyment and the possibility of continual "improvement" of values, that is, for the comparison of enjoyments with each other and the creation of new values which will harmonize conflicts between previous values. Thus Dewey arrives at the same rational and inclusive values that Perry does, but without the use of Perry's external standards.

To realize the extent of the difference between Dewey's theory and those of the other two men, let us turn to one of the most important implications of Dewey's theory, from which various consequences may be seen to follow.

Since in Dewey's theory we have value whenever meanings previously found enter into present enjoyment, values for him are "intrinsic qualities of events in their consummatory reference."¹ That is, they are qualities of events occurring not accidentally but as the result of a process. For the unique characteristic of the end chosen as "the good" is its impregnation by those meanings whose expansion determined the choice. It follows, that to be an end in the sense in which for Dewey values are ends,

1. Dewey, *Experience and Nature*, 1929 edition, preface, p. ix.

is not to be an event isolated from all relationships to other events, but to be the end *of* something, to be the goal or termination of the deliberate action which preceded it. The *end*, therefore, has as its inherent qualities the meanings of the *means* that led to it. Of course the extent to which the means enter into the quality of the end will differ according to the situation, from the type in which the characteristic of bringing to a close a successful effort is predominant, as when we finally succeed in hitting the bull's-eye, to the type in which the previous instrumentalities that enter as immanent meaning are at a minimum, as in the naive enjoyment of delicious food. Nevertheless, whenever the end is an "end-in-view," that is an end consciously chosen and not a mere chance occurrence, it will never be entirely without qualities due to the means employed.

Nor are the means ever unrelated to their end. Because they are recognized as leading to the desired goal, they will be imbued to some extent at least with the desirableness of their effects; they will share, as it were, in the glow of satisfaction felt now at the thought of their consummation. Here again the extent to which the means partake of the satisfaction of the coming end will vary, from the joy, for instance, felt by the artist while in the process of creating his work of art, to the grudging satisfaction felt in going through an effort necessary to achieve a desired result, such as laboring for a day's pay. At this lower limit, where the preliminary actions are "only external and accidental antecedents of the happening of something else,"¹ Dewey makes a distinction of his own; namely, the distinction between what

1. Dewey, *Experience and Nature*, p. 366.

he calls "means" and "causes." Means are those conditions whose connection with their results are essential and inherent; causes are those conditions whose connections are arbitrary and external. By this, he means that in the case of causes, "there is an enforced necessity of doing one thing as a coerced antecedent of another thing which is wanted,"¹ while in the case of means the conditions have been freely chosen² and are "freely used, because of perceived connection with chosen consequences."³ It would be, of course, only in the case of means, not causes, that their meaning would enter into the quality of the end. But on Dewey's own theory it does not seem that we could ever have a situation where the relation between ends and means was recognized, in which at the same time the meaning of the means did not enter to some extent into the quality of the end. The difference in situations would be a difference in the degree to which this type of meaning were present in the end rather than a difference between its presence and its absence. There are, of course, causes which are purely physical; that is, are unrelated to the interests or intentions of men; but with these we are not concerned. Any cause which is more than this, any cause whose connection with its effect is perceived, no matter how external and arbitrary that connection may seem (as in the case of working for a day's pay)—any such recognized cause must, it would seem, carry over into the end as meaning. If this is so, Dewey might have substituted for his distinction between "means" and "causes" a difference in degree in the extent to which ends enter inherently into the constitution of their means.

1. Dewey, *Experience and Nature*, p. 366.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 367, "... effects are not ends unless thought has perceived and freely chosen the conditions."

3. *Ibid.*, p. 366.

In any case, Dewey maintains that there are situations (and all cases of value come under this heading) in which the means are endowed with the desirableness of their consequences, and the consequences when they come are characterized by the meaning of means chosen. This view contrasts sharply, as we can easily see, with Prall's conception of means and end. Defining value in terms of an intuited datum which is isolated from all relationships, Prall necessarily considers values as ends in a very different sense from that in which Dewey considers them as ends. According to Prall, events, though produced by antecedent processes, have their own distinctive quality entirely independently of the qualities of those antecedents. "The causes of things are not the characters of things."¹ And this apparently holds true even when the causes are means deliberately chosen because of perceived connection with the desired end and the end is recognized as the consummation of the chosen means. In other words, we may say that Prall considers all cases of means-end relationship in the same way that Dewey treats cause-effect relationship, bearing in mind Dewey's distinction between "means" and "causes."

Prall's treatment of the means-end relation is due to his concept of meaning. He does not accept the concept of "immanent" meaning on which Dewey's theory is based. For Prall, all meanings are external relationships of the datum intuited; consequently any recognition of meaning involves perception, which to Prall is a simple form of cognition, and hence a process quite different from intuition. All meanings are to Prall what Dewey calls "referential" or explicit meanings; he will not admit of a process such as Dewey's "immediate experience" in which there are no referential meanings hence no cogni-

1. See above, Ch. 2, p. 24, footnote 4.

tion, and yet in which meanings enter as immediately perceived qualities of the object.¹ There is no process as it were in between reflection and intuition, and since the former gives only relationships and the latter only data, the two are quite different in nature. Now Prall considers means as a relationship, while data he considers as ends; consequently, means and ends are likewise entirely different in nature. If means are relationships, and means and ends are correlatives it would seem that ends should also be relationships; but Prall considers ends to be experienced not in relation to their means but immediately, intuitively. When so experienced they are completely isolated from any consciousness of previous

1. It is true that in his *Æsthetic Judgment* Prall speaks of meanings as "specified" in æsthetic surfaces, and thus grasped and enjoyed immediately. See e. g., p. 226, where he denies that "meanings are more clearly specified in words than in the actually present intuited sensuous surfaces of works of art," and p. 343, where he states that in the equipment of an artist must be included "what we may call ideas, in order to express and specify through his technical operations, upon the æsthetic surfaces of his works, meanings that are of depth and scope enough to be worth other men's contemplation, and satisfying to their minds." Also p. 291, "These meanings (presented to us in discourse) are in large part, as we have already seen, ultimately æsthetic data, not so fully specified by linguistic symbols as by actual sensuous and particular æsthetic surfaces, but called up by the imagination, or, in their connections and relations, grasped by the intellect." Ch. 11, "Expression in the Fine Arts," and Ch. 13, "Expressiveness in Nature and Symbolism in Art," also have bearing on this point, since they deal with the place of meaning or significance in beauty. "Intuition and perception," he says (p. 223), "are single processes, involving both sense organs and the mind that uses these organs, and though we may speak of the bare sensuous surface present in intuition, this surface reveals to the mind or spirit that intuits it more than any merely sensuous elements in a unity of form. The surface, that is, must have a degree of depth to be seen or felt at all, and out of its depths comes much of what it exhibits as beauty."

These statements, however, are made where he is dealing with the experience of beauty, which, as we have seen (Ch. 2, p. 12), seems to be more complicated than the experience of mere value need be. It is a far cry from this meaningful "beauty" to the "tropism" that constitutes value! (Ch. 2, p. 12) Moreover, in the *Æsthetic Judgment* itself he makes statements in perfect accord with his other view; we have already noted (Ch. 2, p. 11) his view that "It is characteristic of æsthetic apprehension that the surface fully present to sense is the total object of apprehension. We do not so much perceive an object as intuit its appearance, and as we leave this surface in our attention, to go deeper into meanings or more broadly into connections and relations, we depart from the typically æsthetic attitude."

Since he does not officially repudiate his view that the intuition of essences and the perception of relationships (including meanings) are separate processes, and since this view seems more in accord with his entire position as stated in his other works, it is the view accepted as being his throughout this paper.

factors; the means have disappeared, not only explicitly as means but also implicitly as meanings.

Perry, while he does not treat so specifically of means and ends, seems to take a middle ground between Prall and Dewey. Because of the intimate relation of the mediating judgment to interest, Perry does not say, as does Prall, that value is independent of meaning; that the end when it comes is isolated from all relationships with the process that led to it. Nevertheless, for Perry meaning never constitutes value in the slightest degree. The *rational* interest is not more valuable because of the elements of cognition or meaning that have entered into it, but merely because the rational good is the more inclusive good and by virtue of that fact is better than the irrational. The value, then, is judged by a standard which does not take into consideration the elements of meaning involved in the interest; or else, as in the case of the standard of correctiveness, the mediating judgment is judged quite independently of the interest itself. It would seem to follow that means and ends can be judged independently of each other. In other words, Perry differs from Prall in connecting value and meaning more intimately, but he differs from Dewey in using standards of criticism which apply to either value or meaning separately (and consequently to either ends or means separately) but not to them both combined.

Let us look at some of the fields in which this difference in point of view towards the relations of means and end, that is towards the instrumental and the final, might have important implications. In the field of art, for instance, there is a noticeable difference in the attitude of the three men. Since to Prall an æsthetic experience is pure intuition, all experiences of beauty will be, as it were, instantaneous flashes of emotion, that are felt to

be utterly and completely self-sufficient. They are moments in which "the end is finally and fully and absorbingly reached and all instrumentalities have vanished."¹ The effect of this view is to make objects of æsthetic enjoyment something called "ends-in-themselves," something self-justifying regardless of their relation to the rest of experience. From life as a whole, certain moments of emotional ecstasy are chosen, and they alone are considered valuable. Since works of art provide the greatest stimulus to this type of experience they are to be sought, both in appreciation and creation, and always for the express purpose of being lifted out of yourself, as it were, and given a moment of trance-like joy. In the presence of a beautiful object, Prall says, "we rest . . . as Aristotle's God does—unmoved, not thinking. Or as any mortal does in the face of beauty which is really his. . . . Art moves us instantaneously or not at all. It may be years before we see anything very complex as beautiful; but when we do, it is at a glance, between breaths. So æsthetic trances have been mistaken for eternity, which occur, I suppose, instead of enduring."² Beauty is always felt to be complete and perfect.

Now Perry seems to hold a different view of the nature of the enjoyment felt by Aristotle's God. In express agreement with Professor Pepper, Perry maintains that "æsthetic enjoyment depends not only upon the tang of novelty, but also upon the zest of experimental effort. Perfect ease of adjustment renders the object banal, and taste, like ambition, craves new worlds to conquer. . . . A God or Absolute conceived as deriving perfect happiness from contemplation must first alienate the truth and then learn it."³

1. Prall, *Metaphysics and Value*, p. 135.

2. Prall, "Value and Thought Process," p. 124.

3. Perry, *Theory*, p. 562. See also above, Ch. 3, p. 29, footnote 3.

Nevertheless, Perry believes that the æsthetic interest,¹ because it is an interest in the appearance of things rather than their workings, "is quiescent, tending to perpetuate experience in any form that is found pleasant, and without respect either to practical exigencies or to the order of truth."² For this reason the æsthetic interest has a danger of its own, the danger that if it becomes dominant in life it will tend towards inaction and ineffectiveness. It is after all only one interest among many, and must not be allowed to interfere with that balance or integration of interests which for Perry constitutes the supreme good. He, therefore, distinguishes carefully between the æsthetic and the moral, the latter being the more inclusive of the two. "Art, like all other interests, can flourish only in a sound and whole society, and the law of soundness and wholeness in life is morality."³

While Perry thus separates art and morals in the interests of morality, and Prall, as we have seen in a previous chapter, separates them in the interests of the æsthetic, Dewey's theory of value brings them close together, for both alike depend upon the enrichment of present experience through increase of meaning. Æsthetic experience, for Dewey, is not one without meaning, but one in which because explicit reflection is at a minimum, all meaning is "condensed" and immanent. In an experience of beauty the union of enjoyment and meaning is complete.

1. By the "æsthetic interest" Perry means the "interest in apprehension," which he defines as "not an interest in what can be done with the object, nor in its real structure, but in the present conscious reaction to it . . . It is the interest simply in looking at things, in just the perceiving, feeling, thinking, or imagining them." *Moral Economy*, p. 180.

2. *Moral Economy*, p. 193. See also *ibid.*, "In so far as an object appeals only to the æsthetic interest it tends not to develop, but to retain some fixed aspect in which the apprehension of it is agreeable."

3. *Moral Economy*, p. 174. See also *ibid.*, p. 173, "The confusion of goodness with beauty tends to substitute appreciation for action, and thus make of life a spectacle rather than an enterprise." This, of course, is in sharp contrast to Prall's view of the subject.

Consequently, a real work of art is one in which "meanings that are signs and clues, and meanings that are immediately possessed, suffered and enjoyed, come together in one."¹ An object of which this were not true, an object which were pleasing only in a totally unmeaningful way, would not have the lasting quality which characterizes art at its best. "A consummatory object that is not also instrumental, turns in time to the dust and ashes of boredom. The 'eternal' quality of great art is its renewed instrumentality for further consummatory experience."² For Dewey, then, art is pre-eminently the harmony of the finished and the incomplete, the restful and stimulating. Like all values, it is the union of the final and the instrumental.

The same is true of Dewey's moral values. He is far from considering morality, as Prall does, merely a means to some end, whether beauty or happiness or perfection.³ At the same time, he never considers it an "end-in-itself," an "end" unrelated to anything else. Morality is rather a union of means and end, a process that is at the same time immediately satisfying and productive of increasing expansion of meaning. For "morals means growth of conduct in meaning, at least it means that kind of expansion in meaning which is consequent upon observations of the conditions and outcome of conduct."⁴ To act morally, then, is to act with intelligent foresight and understanding of the consequences of your act, to act, as it were, with an eye toward the future; but it is also to invest your present activity with a new quality, to enrich it by making it more significant and hence more satisfactory.

1. Dewey, *Experience and Nature*, p. 359.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 365.

3. See Dewey, *Human Nature and Conduct*, 1922, p. 365, "Whether that goal be thought of as pleasure, as virtue, as perfection, as final enjoyment of salvation, is secondary to the fact that the moralists who have asserted fixed ends have in all their differences from one another agreed in the basic idea that present activity is but a means."

4. *Ibid.*, p. 280.

Happiness is an end to moral action, a goal; but in the sense in which Dewey uses the word, a goal is one of the characteristics of present action that give it meaning.¹ Thus morality involves the immediate appreciation of meaning just as art does; it is really a form of art, and all art that is really great is moral. This identifying morality, like art, with enhanced living is an attempt to avoid both the "hard" morality of duty, and the "softer" cult of beauty as the moral criterion. If in æsthetic experience the consummatory aspect is more evident, and in moral experience the instrumental, the difference is merely one of degree. Both alike illustrate the view that "the characteristic human need is for possession and appreciation of the meanings of things."²

This same point is brought out in Dewey's theory of education, which grows directly out of his concept of immanent meaning, and which is intimately related both to art and to morals. In the broadest sense of the word education it is identical with them.³ To Dewey, education "that reconstruction or reorganization of experience which adds to the meaning of experience and which increases ability to direct the course of subsequent experience."⁴ is not preparation for living, it is a characteristic of life itself, when life is to any degree intelligent. Like the achievement of any other values, it will have both the consummatory effect of enriching present

1. See Dewey, *Human Nature and Conduct*, p. 265, "We have insisted that happiness, reasonableness, virtue, perfecting, are . . . parts of the present significance of present action . . . Happiness is fundamental in morals only because happiness is not something to be sought for, but is now attained, even in the midst of pain and trouble, whenever recognition of our ties with nature and with fellow men releases and informs our action." See also his *Experience and Nature*, p. 367, "A disposition of virtue is a means to a certain quality of happiness because it is a constituent of that good, while such happiness is in turn a means to virtue, as the sustaining of good in being."

2. Dewey, *Experience and Nature*, p. 362.

3. Dewey, *Bulletin of the New York Academy of Medicine*, Vol. 4, 1928, p. 19, "the supreme art—the art of education"; also *Human Nature and Conduct*, p. 280, "In the largest sense of the word, morals is education."

4. Dewey, *Democracy and Education*, 1916, p. 89.

experience and the instrumental effect of making future conduct more desirable. It is present experience "enhanced" by the very fact that it is of such a nature as enables the individual continually to increase his ability to readjust himself, and through criticism to achieve new values.

To Prall the purpose of education is "to learn to like the right things,"¹ but according to his own theory of value, what can be meant by "the right things" except those felt to be "right" by the one doing the educating? With sheer preference taken as the criterion of value, it would seem that the education of children would consist of the training or "conditioning" of their preferences to be in accord with what their elders would like them to prefer. Again Prall says, "The object of all study and education is to achieve taste";² but as we have seen, his standard of taste often comes near to being the normal or usual,³ and when such is the case, the effect of the theory would be extreme conservatism and lack of criticism in the sense we have been using the word.

Although Perry had laid more emphasis on independence and resourcefulness in thinking as an aim of education,⁴ yet in his treatment of moral education, he suggests that it consists of "implanting"⁵ interests in the subject. His "four methods of appeal or inducement," for instance—providing a suitable occasion for an interest the subject already has; arousing an interest by exhibiting that interest yourself; starving the interest by depriving it of eligible objects and thus stimulating it;

1. Prall, *Present Status*, etc., p. 102. See also quotation below.

2. Prall, *In Defence of a Worthless Theory of Value*, p. 133, "The object of all study and education is to achieve taste, the ability to like rightly and adequately in all the fields of our experience."

3. See above, Ch. 2, p. 23.

4. See Perry's chapter, "The University and the Individual," in his *The Freeman and the Soldier*, 1916.

5. Perry, *Theory*, p. 525.

satisfying or removing all other interests to make the subject more susceptible to the one you wish¹—seem more closely related to propaganda than to education. They involve a change in motor-affective attitude irrespective of judgment or cognition. On the other hand, of course, Perry's standard of correctness to be applied to the mediating judgments, and the importance he lays on rationalization as the method of integrating interests, suggest that the purpose of education would be to enable the individual, through clear thinking, to stabilize and harmonize his interests, and make social coöperation possible. So for the same reason that he has two kinds of standards of criticism, Perry will have two kinds of educational process, one seeking to modify the motor-affective attitudes of the person independently of cognition, the other seeking to correct and expand his mediating judgments. In this way Perry's view of education contrasts with Dewey's single process of enabling the person to create new values through increase in meaning.

It follows from Dewey's complete integration of motor-affective attitude and cognition through his concept of immanent meanings as qualities of objects, that his theory of value does away with any hard and fast distinction between science and other fields of experience. To Prall science deals, as does all forms of cognition, with the perception of relationships, not with the intuition of data; therefore, it deals with means, not ends, facts, not values. To Perry, the judgments, which, when systematized, constitute science, can mediate interests but never themselves create values. To Dewey, on the contrary, science is a specialized form of that same process of reflective inquiry that constitutes criticism in whatever field it may occur, and thus enters directly into the

1. See Perry, *Theory*, pp. 525-526.

creation of values. His theory of value definitely opposes the division of experience into "two realms, one of intellectual objects without value and the other of value-objects without intellect. . . . Hence the primary function of philosophy at present is to make clear that there is no such difference as this division assumes between science, morals and æsthetic appreciation. All alike exhibit the difference between immediate goods casually occurring and immediate goods which have been reflectively determined by means of critical inquiry. . . . All cases manifest the same duality and present the same problem; that of embodying intelligence in action which shall convert natural goods, whose causes and effects are unknown, into goods valid for thought, right for conduct and cultivated for appreciation."¹

We have suggested before that a difference in theories of criticism might lead to a difference in attitude towards social problems. Let us consider for a moment some of the difficulties that men face in their various social relationships; for example, the perpetual problem of individual freedom vs. restraint for the purpose of achieving other results desired; industrial conflicts and disputes, involving often condemnation of our whole present industrial system; the apprehension felt by many at the seeming absorption of this country with material possessions to the exclusion of the less tangible; the grave doubts expressed concerning the ultimate benefits of "American" efficiency and standardization; outbursts of friction due to racial and religious prejudice; and the increasingly important problem of combining successfully national and international loyalties.

These and all similar problems Prall would consider to be merely questions of means not of ends, and, conse-

1. Dewey, *Experience and Nature*, pp. 406-407.

quently, to be irrelevant to the topic of value. But they can be considered as means only if it is assumed that the persons involved in the difficulties are entirely agreed on the ends desired, and disagree only on the machinery for accomplishing them. This would not seem to be the case. The question at issue seems, rather, to be a question of values, the question as to which of the things desired is "desirable," and this is a question which could never be settled by taking each individual's preferences as final and unquestionable. It would seem as though, under a theory which placed values above discussion, there could be no unifying of preferences except by the domination, either physical or mental, of one individual over the others. When this kind of unification is not possible and disagreement remains, the controversy may be deplored, but will be inevitable.

For since, according to this theory, the agreement that does exist among men's valuing depends upon the similarity in the native structure of their minds, the agreement will be, as it were, accidental in nature. That is, it will occur by chance rather than be achieved through intentional, reflective integration of purposes. And because such agreement was not attained by intelligent effort on the part of men, it will be scarcely capable of further development by means of such effort. There will be little or no possibility of building up a society based less on what men happen to prefer and more on consciously worked-out coöperation. Therefore, the attitude resulting from this theory of value towards existing institutions and traditions will tend to be conservative, accompanied perhaps by a tendency to retire from the bustle of affairs to the enjoyment of pure contemplation, since it is there alone that value is to be found.

In contrast to this, the effect of Dewey's theory of thought or criticism as an essential constituent of value, is to make value more social and more progressive. Criticism, as reflective, scientific inquiry naturally extends beyond the limits of the reactions of one person, and includes joint discussion and experimentation. Dewey's theory does not guarantee that men will ever be in perfect accord as to what is and what is not valuable; only reasonable agreement, such as scientists might show in deciding on a "fact," can be hoped for. But his theory provides a method by which men may, by continually making their desires more intelligent, coöperate further and further in building up intentionally a community of interests.

This community of interests would, of course, for Dewey never be achieved once and for all. All values, because of the very way they are created, are subject to criticism and revision. Thus, one effect of his theory is a general loosening up and liberalizing of ideas. For belief in the use of intelligence in the creation of values means belief in the use of intelligence as the directive force in all affairs including the social and political; and this means liberalism; that is, a thoroughly experimental attitude toward all existing institutions and doctrines.¹ As long as intelligence is the court of appeals in establishing a value, no individual preference and no ready-made standard can claim to have the last word. In this characteristic, then, lies the main distinction between the value-theory of Dewey and those of Perry and Prall—that in Dewey's theory the very method of achieving the

1. See Dewey, "Justice Holmes and the Liberal Mind," *New Republic*, Vol. 53, especially his definitions of liberalism, p. 210, as "a method of intelligence prior to being a method of action, as a method of experimentation" signifying "the adoption of the scientific habit of mind in application of social affairs," and as "belief in the conclusions of intelligence as the finally directive force in life . . . and in the experimental character of life and thought."

present value furnishes the direction and the means for continual revaluation. His theory alone, then, provides a concept of value in which there is inherent in the valuing process itself, criticism of the sort which leads to the resolving of conflicts between values and thus to the solving of social problems.

Conclusion

Perry, Prall and Dewey, in their different treatment of the relation of value and criticism, represent different attitudes towards the function of thought in experience. If Dewey's theory of value is the only one of the three in which, as we have seen, criticism grows inherently out of the concept of value itself, it is because he is the only one of the three whose epistemology will allow this. For the controversy over value in which these men engage is really a further manifestation of the old disagreement among the idealists, realists and instrumentalists as to the relation of thought to its object, the relation of the knower and the known.

In their desire to avoid the position of idealism, that thought constitutes the object of knowledge, Perry and Prall have maintained the strictly realistic position, that thought cognizes but never constitutes its object. To Perry, the "transcendent object"¹ to which judgment is a response, and to Prall the datum which the mind intuit²s are both alike entirely unaffected by the relationship with a knower into which they have come. It is clear that in such a system thought is given an additive rather than a creative role; it plays the part of spectator to an otherwise complete reality. The effect of having thought uncreative and thus unimportant ontologically is seen clearly when they carry their epistemology over into value-theory, where they naturally deny that thought ever in any sense constitutes the value-object. Value, consequently, must be created by some entirely non-cognitive process, some purely motor-affective attitude

1. See Perry, *Theory*, p. 333.

2. See Prall, "Metaphysics and Value," p. 121

considered void of any thought process; and thus judgment or criticism must necessarily be a process quite distinct from that of valuing.

Dewey's epistemological position is that neither of the idealists nor of the realists. To him meanings, which are the product of thought, become as we have seen the qualities of the object as we experience it. "The object" presumably had its existing characteristics prior to our thought; what is changed by the thinking is not the object as such, but the meaning of the object; that is, the total situation in which the object functions. Since "the object" apart from the situation is for Dewey an abstraction, a change in the total situation is a change in concrete reality. Thinking is a reorganizing of our responses on the basis of new meanings; and, consequently, it involves *action*, which, of course, has "practical" or existential effects; i. e., effects on prior existences. Thus, for him thought, because it is productive of meanings which would otherwise not have occurred, is ontologically creative, and the addition of meanings to existence is a real change in an incomplete and growing universe. The application of this epistemology to theory of value means that the value-object, like any other object of knowledge, is constituted in part by the thinking which has given it its qualities of meaning. The same process, therefore, by which we judge or criticize values enters into the creation of values in the first place.

While this difference in epistemology is of primary importance, another difference, a difference in the type of experience emphasized by the three men, helps to account for the contrast found in their value-theories. For the three theories, though all relativistic, and with much in common, show clearly the difference in the dominant interests of their respective authors. Prall's

acceptance of critical realism, combined with his interest in the type of experience ordinarily termed æsthetic, results in his explanation of value in terms of the satisfying contemplation of intuited data. Perry's behavioristic realism, plus his interest in social and moral issues, leads to that combination of the motor-affective and the rational found in his interpretation of value as constituted by interests, but primarily by interests mediated by cognition and measured by the social standard of inclusiveness. Dewey's instrumentalism, together with the predominance of social motivation in his thinking, leads to a value-theory somewhat similar to Prall's in its recognition of the qualitative uniqueness of every value-experience, but nearer to Perry's in its final emphasis on the social and rational nature of value as enjoyed meanings. So we find, as is not surprising, that both metaphysics and individual perspective have entered into these contrasting accounts of the nature of value. From the point of view of philosophic theory, however, the former seems the more important.

Thus at the center of the problem of value lie differences in epistemology and ontology, and, consequently, the topic provides one more battleground for metaphysical controversies of a very fundamental nature. At the same time, as we have seen, value-theories because of their implications for theories of criticism, have bearing on the possibilities and methods of solving actual human problems. For this reason the problem of value, as it appears in contemporary philosophy, seems to have unique importance in serving as a connecting link between the most abstruse metaphysical controversies, and those affairs of living with which all men are directly concerned. It serves as a bridge, if such be needed, between philosophy and life.

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